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This document presents the latest of three rounds of the EQI data on regional 
governance in EU countries (Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2014, 2015; Charron, 
Lapuente and Rothstein 2013).  While this round of data largely builds on the work of 
previous rounds, there are several alterations based on suggestions from a Rauch 
analysis of the 2010, and 2013 rounds of the EQI data (Annoni and Charron 2017).  In 
this document, we highlight the sample, summary statistics and question items that 
are included in the 2017 round of the EQI.  Together with national estimates from the 
World Bank Governance Indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009), we report 
data on Quality of Government (‘QoG’) for all EU 28 countries and for NUTS 1 and 
NUTS 2 regions for 21 EU countries, totaling 185 regions12.  The QoG questions are 
aimed at capturing average citizens’ perceptions and experiences with corruption, and 
the extent to which they rate their public services as impartial and of good quality. 
In addition, we highlight broad patterns as we see them in the data and more 
specifically analyze trend in the EQI over time within regions.  Using several statistical 
and observational techniques, we elucidated four interesting case studies from Spain 
and Poland, which were  undertaken to better draw out ‘best practices’ to improve 
governance at the sub-national level in other EU regions. 
 
  
                                                 
1  The 2017 round of survey data and research was funded by the EU Commission via an EU Tender 
“Measuring Quality of Government and Sub-National Variation” 
2  NUTS stands for ‘Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics’ and more can be read about this at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/nuts_nomenclature/introduction   
Kosovo is included, and because it is technically still a region in Serbia according to the EU, it is coded 
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PART I: EQI survey, methodology & results 
2. Background, Methodology and Sample 
The field work began during the month of May, 2017 and were conducted in the local 
majority language in each country/region.  The results were returned to the Quality of 
Government Institute in August, 2017.   
The E.U. regional survey was undertaken by Efficience 3 (E3), a French market-
research, Survey Company specializing in public opinion throughout Europe for 
researchers, politicians and advertising firms.  E3 has also conducted the 2010 and 
2013 rounds of the EQI and were thus familiar with the question format and goals of 
the survey.  E3 conducted the interviews themselves in several countries and used 
sub-contracting partners in others3.  The respondents, from 18 years of age or older, 
were contacted randomly via telephone in the local language. Telephone interviews 
were conducted via both landlines and mobile phones, with both methods being used 
in most countries.  Decisions about whether to contact residents more often via land 
or mobile lines was based on local expertise of market research firms in each country.  
For purposes of regional placement, respondents were asked the post code of their 
address to verify the area/ region of residence if mobile phones were used.   
Ideally, a survey would be a mirror image of actual societal demographics – gender, 
income, education, rural-urban, ethnicity, etc.  However, we are not privy to exact 
demographic distributions; in particular at the regional level in most cases, thus 
imposing artificial demographic lines might lead to even more problems than benefits.   
We thus sought the next best solution. Based on their expert advice, to achieve a 
random sample, we used what was known in survey-research as the ‘next birthday 
method’.  The next birthday method is an alternative to the so-called quotas method.  
When using the quota method for instance, one obtains a (near) perfectly 
representative sample – e.g. a near exact proportion of the amount of men, women, 
certain minority groups, people of a certain age, income, etc. However, as one 
searches for certain demographics within the population, one might end up with only 
‘available’ respondents, or those that are more ‘eager’ to respond to surveys, which 
can lead to less variation in the responses, or even bias in the results.  The ‘next-
birthday’ method, which simply requires the interviewer to ask the person who 
answers the phone who in their household will have the next birthday, still obtains a 
reasonably representative sample of the population.  The interviewer must take the 
person who has the next coming birthday in the household (if this person is not 
available, the interviewer makes an appointment), thus not relying on whomever 
might simply be available to respond in the household.  So, where the quota method 
is stronger in terms of a more even demographic spread in the sample, the next-
birthday method is stronger at ensuring a better range of opinion.  The next-birthday 
method was thus chosen because we felt that what we might have lost in demographic 
representation in the sample would be made up for by a better distribution of opinion.  
In attempt to compensate for some key demographic over/under-representation, E3 
provides weights based on age and gender for each region, comparing the sample 
drawn to actual demographic statistics from Eurostat.  In the end, we find variation in 
response and refusal rates by country, which could have to do with many factors 
including the sensitivity of one of the primary the topics at hand – corruption. A 
breakdown of the sample response rate, land line vs. mobile phone use, etc. is listed 
in the table below by country.  
 
                                                 
3  http://www.efficience3.com/en/accueil/index.html. For names of the specific firms to which Efficience 3 




Table 1: Sample by Country 
Country NUTS lvl # regions 
n per 
NUTS total n 
% 
sample 
1 France 2 26 401 10422 13.4 
2 Belgium 1 3 450 1350 1.7 
3 Bulgaria 2 6 400 2400 3.1 
4 Czech Republic 2 8 450 3600 4.6 
5 Slovakia 2 4 450 1800 2.3 
6 Hungary 2 7* 400 2800 3.6 
7 Croatia 2 2 450 900 1.2 
8 Romania 2 8 450 3600 4.6 
9 Finland 2 5 400 2000 2.6 
10 Italy 2 21 400 8400 10.8 
11 Greece 1 4 405 1620 2.1 
12 Portugal 2 7 400 2800 3.6 
13 Denmark 2 5 450 2250 2.9 
14 Sweden 1 3 400 1200 1.5 
15 Germany 1 16 450 7200 9.2 
16 UK 1 12 450 5400 6.9 
17 Ireland 2 2 450 900 1.2 
18 Austria 2 9 450 4050 5.2 
19 Netherlands 1 4* 460 1840 2.4 
20 Poland 2 16 403 6442 8.3 
21 Spain 2 17 411 6992 9 
Total   185   77966 100 
Note: *Hungary was a NUTS 1 country in 2010 and 2013 and is now at NUTS 2.  Netherlands 
was a NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 country in 2010 and 2013 respectively and is now at NUTS 1, yet 
NUTS 2 regions are calculated so as to make comparisons with 2013 data. 
 
Two issues in the preparation of this study are worthy of mention here.  First, in some 
areas, such as immigration, customs, defence or the judicial arena, we do not expect 
much variation from region to region within countries at all.  Thus to maximize 
regional variation on the QoG-oriented question in the survey, we elected to limit the 
questions in the survey to only those policy areas that are most often either governed 
or administered by sub-national bodies.  In the end, three policy areas were selected – 
health care, education and law enforcement.  In addition to these three policy areas, 
we also inquire about the integrity of regional elections as well as the impartiality of 
the tax authorities. 
The second issue to deal with is the fact that in some countries – such as Germany, 
Belgium, Italy or Spain – the regions that we are targeting in the questions are both 
politically and administratively meaningful.  That is to say that these regional 
governments are elected by their local constituents, and that these governments have 
their own autonomous revenues (either from directly taxing citizens, or central 
government transfers or both) and have a degree of autonomy with which to 
redistribute resources in the form of public services.  However, in more politically 
centralized countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia or Portugal, this issue 
becomes more challenging.  The regions that we are targeting (NUTS 1 or NUTS 2) 
while meaningful in the sense that EU development funds are targeted directly to 
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them and that Eurostat reports annual data on them, they have in some cases been 
mainly an invention for EU statistical purposes, yet not politically meaningful.  
Therefore asking a respondent in some cases ‘how would you rate the quality ‘X’ 
service in your region of ‘Y’’ might be very confusing, since respondents from 
countries like Hungary or Romania might not recognize that they are even living in 
region ‘Y’.  It can therefore be argued that the administrative and political 
responsibility of the regions in these three public services varies in different countries 
and thus this may be problematic for this data gathering.  However this study argues 
otherwise, in that we attempt to capture all regional variation within a country and, as 
several other scholars have noted (e.g. Tabellini 2005; Charron and Lapuente 2013), 
there are numerous empirical indications and anecdotal evidence pointing out that the 
provision and quality of public services controlled by a powerful central government 
can nonetheless largely vary across different regions. 
In the 2010 and 2013 rounds, in order to synthesize the survey and make the results 
as comparable between and within countries as possible, we asked respondents about 
questions focusing around three key concepts of QoG – the ‘quality’ of the services 
themselves, the extent to which they are administered ‘impartiality’ and extent to 
which ‘corruption’ exists in their area.  In countries where the NUTS region is not 
recognizable, we continue with this approach.  However, in 2017, for countries with 
politically relevant regions, we elected to attempt to maximize validity and regional 
variation at the regional level by substituting the local word for the regional level in 
question in lieu of ‘in your area’.  For example, in Germany, a respondent would hear 





Table 2: Demographic summary of Respondents 2017 survey 
category   % respondents 
Gender   
   male 48.6 
  female 51.4 
Education   
  <Primary 10.1 
  some secondary 17.6 
  secondary 34.2 
  college/university 27.8 
  post-grad degree 10 
  n/a 0.3 
Age     
  18-29 18 
  30-44 35.8 
  45-64 26.9 
  >65 19.3 
  n/a 0.1 
Income     
  Low 26.2 
  Medium 31.6 
  High 28.8 
  n/a 13.4 
Employment   
  Public sector 19.8 
  private sector 39.8 
  student 4.2 
  unemployed 6 
  Housewife/man 3.7 
  retired 24.6 
  other 1.3 
  n/a 0.6 
Population   
  <10k 32.9 
  10k-100k 37.5 
  100k-1m 20.9 
  >1m 6.8 
  n/a 2.1 
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3. 2017 Survey Question Items 
Several empirical (based on Annoni and Charron 2017) and conceptual improvements 
are made to the question items that make up the EQI index in 2017.  In sum, three 
key changes have been made. First, the scale of the questions has been changed.  In 
previous years we used an odd-numbered 11 point scale.  However, we found that the 
‘5’ response (mid-point) was overused and might be lead to misleading results.  An 
even ’10 point’ scale is now employed to keep the variation of a larger scale but to 
eliminate the middle category which may have been representing ‘don’t know’ at 
times.   Second, two questions have been removed due to poor performance, and 
three others have been added, for a total of 17 question items (compared with 16 in 
the previous two rounds).  Third, as noted, we emphasize the regional level in 
question in the local langue by country when relevant (as opposed to ‘in your area’ in 
previous years in all cases)4.   
We begin however by highlighting the ‘core’ questions that have remained in the three 
rounds of the survey over time. 
First, in question 4-6 in the current survey, respondents rate the quality of their three 
public services in question on a scale of ‘1’ (extremely poor quality) to ‘10’ (extremely 
high quality): 
4. ‘How would you rate the quality of public education in your area5?’ (edqual) 
5. ‘How would you rate the quality of the public health care system in your area?’ 
(helqual) 
6. ‘How would you rate the quality of the police force in your area?’ (lawqual) 
 
The next six questions try to capture the extent to which public services are delivered 
impartially in the regions of Europe.  ‘Impartiality’ is admittedly a more complicated 
concept to put forth to respondents than ‘quality’, so we framed this question in two 
ways –with a more negative tone, and a more positive tone.  In the first three 
questions (7-9), we asked citizens to rate whether they agreed that ‘certain people’ 
get special advantages when dealing with the public service in question from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree).  The second set of questions (10-12) asks 
respondents whether all people in their region are ‘treated equally’ by the service in 
question on a four point scale (1. Agree, 2. rather agree, 3. rather disagree or 4. 
Disagree).  We use all six questions in the final index to allow for as much variation as 
possible while not letting either the ‘positively’ or ‘negatively’ framed question 
determine the impartiality data alone. 
7. “Certain people are given special advantages in the public education system in my 
area.” (edimpart1) 
8. “Certain people are given special advantages in the public health care system in my 
area.” (helimpart1) 
  
                                                 
4  In cases where countries have politically relevant or recognizable regions at the NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 





9. “The police force gives special advantages to certain people in my area.” 
(lawimpart1) 
10. “All citizens are treated equally in the public education system in my area” 
(edimpart2) 
11. “All citizens are treated equally in the public health care system in my area” 
(helimpart2) 
12. “All citizens are treated equally by the police force in my area” (lawimpart2) 
The next three questions deal with respondents’ perception of the extent to which 
corruption is present in their public services, along with a general question of how 
often they believe that ‘others in their area’ use corruption to obtain public services.  
Again, perceptions may not capture the full story, however, as Kaufman et al (2009:3) 
argue “perceptions matter because agents base their actions on their perceptions, 
impression, and views”, thus if citizens believe their public services are inefficient or 
corruption, they are less likely to use their services, likewise with foreign firms and 
investment in countries perceived to be plagued with problems of rent-seeking and 
public sector mismanagement.  However, we complement these questions with 
additional questions about respondents’ actual experience with bribery later on.  The 
first three questions are scaled as 1-10, with ‘1’ being “strongly disagree” and ‘10’ 
being “strongly agree”.  
13. “Corruption is prevalent in my area’s local public school system” (edcorr) 
14. “Corruption is prevalent in the public health care system in my area” (helcorr) 
15. “Corruption is prevalent in the police force in my area” (lawcorr) 
The following two question constitute a slight change from the previous 2010 and 
2013 rounds, whereby instead of asking citizens about either ‘how often others 
engage in bribery to obtain public services’ (2010), or asking respondents about 
corruption for ‘special advantages’ (2013), we split these ideas of so called ‘need’ and 
‘greed’ corruption (Bauhr 2014) into the following two questions (1-10, with ‘1’ being 
“strongly disagree” and ‘10’ being “strongly agree”) 
16a. People in my area must use some form of corruption to just to get some basic 
public services 
16b. Corruption in my area is used to get access to special unfair privileges and 
wealth. 
In addition to corruption perceptions questions, we ask about citizens’ direct 
experience with corruption.  In contrast to 2010 and 2013, where we only inquired 
about whether a respondent paid a bribe for one of the public service in question, we 
add whether the respondent was asked to pay a bribe by a public sector employee at 
one of the services in question so as to attempt to capture the direction of who is the 
‘initiator’.  For the final index, we code a respondent as ‘1’ for Q17 or 18 if they 
answered ‘yes’ to any of the four sub-questions. 
17. In the last 12 months, have you or anyone in your family been asked by a public 
official to give an informal gift or bribe in: (a): Education services? (b): Health or 
medical services? (c): Police? d) any other public service? ‘(yes/no)’ (bribe) 
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18. ‘In the past 12 months have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in 
any form to: (a): Education services? (b): Health or medical services? (c): Police? d) 
any other public service? ‘(yes/no)’ (bribe) 
 
Finally, we ask about two other relevant regional aspects of QoG, namely the extent to 
which corruption is present in their area’s elections and the respondents’ view of how 
fair the tax authorities are.  In previous rounds, we inquired about one’s trust in their 
area’s media in reporting on matters of corruption in the public sector and among 
politicians.   
Q19-20: Please respond to the following 2 questions with the following ('0' strongly 
disagree - '10' strongly agree) 
Q18: “Elections in my area are clean from corruption” (elections) 
Q20: The tax authorities in my area treat all people equally (tax) 
 
4. Construction of the EQI 
We begin by taking the country average from the World Bank’s WGI data for four 
indicators: ‘control of corruption’, ‘government effectiveness’, ‘rule of law’ and ‘voice 
and accountability’ and combine the four into one composite index (equal weighting)6 
The data is taken for the most recent year of publication (in this case 2015). Then, the 
combined WGI data is standardized for the EU sample. This figure is used as country’s 
mean score in the EQI for all countries in the sample so as to combine those countries 
outside the survey with those in it as well as to ‘anchor’ the regional QoG estimates in 
a national context that is not captured by the regionally-based survey questions7   
Table 3 shows the results of the latest national level WGI scores by country and 
indicator.  The countries are in rank order and grouped together based on the result of 
a cluster analysis8 of that grouped together countries that were most similar on the 
four individual WGI indicators.  The scores are then added together (equal weighting) 
and then standardized within the sample of 30 European countries.  As a point of 
reference, we also provide the rank-change from the 2013 EQI (which used 2011 WGI 
data) 
We see six cluster groups in the data.  The most difficult states to place were Malta 
and Cyprus, as they could also belong to group 4, yet in the end were placed in group 
3.  Moreover, when changing some assumptions of the cluster analysis, Slovakia could 
be placed in the higher group 4.  We observe that the rank order of countries has not 
changed for most of the states in the sample, and most changes are only 1-2 places.  
Notable exceptions are Cyprus, Austria, and Hungary, which fell three places, and 
Spain which fell five places respectively since the EQI 2013 (which used the latest 
published WGI data at that time, which was from 2011).  Notable improvements were 
Estonia and Portugal, which climbed three and Lithuania, which made the largest 
changes at plus 6 in the rankings within the EU28.  In addition, Greece now enters the 
                                                 
6  In addition, we underwent extensive sensitivity testing of each of these 4 pillars of QoG from the World 
Bank and found the data to be highly robust. For a closer look at the sensitivity tests and results for the 
EU sample of countries see Charron, Nicholas. 2010. “Assessing The Quality of the Quality of 
Government Data: A Sensitivity Test of the World Bank Government Indicators.” QoG Working paper. 
7  Charron 2013 provides more on this point. 




bottom group, where Romania and Bulgaria had been the only EU28 countries in the 
first two rounds.   
 
Table 3: Country Level Governance Indicators and Rankings 
2017 
rank 







1 FINLAND 2.28 2.07 1.82 1.56 1.93 1.446 2 1 
2 SWEDEN 2.25 2.04 1.81 1.6 1.92 1.428 3 1 
3 DENMARK 2.23 2.04 1.85 1.57 1.92 1.425 1 -2 
4 NETHERLANDS 1.89 1.93 1.84 1.57 1.81 1.232 4 0 
5 LUXEMBOURG 2.12 1.86 1.72 1.52 1.81 1.226 5 0 
6 GERMANY 1.82 1.78 1.74 1.43 1.69 1.034 7 1 
7 UK 1.87 1.81 1.74 1.27 1.67 0.995 8 1 
8 IRELAND 1.64 1.79 1.54 1.35 1.58 0.839 9 1 
9 AUSTRIA 1.49 1.85 1.47 1.4 1.55 0.796 6 -3 
10 BELGIUM 1.58 1.42 1.44 1.39 1.46 0.636 10 0 
11 FRANCE 1.28 1.41 1.44 1.18 1.33 0.413 11 0 
12 ESTONIA 1.25 1.33 1.09 1.17 1.21 0.213 15 3 
13 PORTUGAL 0.92 1.14 1.23 1.12 1.1 0.031 16 3 
14 MALTA 0.92 1.15 0.85 1.18 1.03 -0.101 13 -1 
15 CYPRUS 0.98 1.01 1.04 1.04 1.02 -0.116 12 -3 
16 LITHUANIA 0.56 0.98 1.2 0.97 0.93 -0.27 22 6 
17 SLOVENIA 0.73 0.95 0.97 0.95 0.9 -0.317 17 0 
18 CZECH REP. 0.39 1.12 1.05 1.02 0.9 -0.323 18 0 
19 SPAIN 0.49 0.9 1.18 1.02 0.89 -0.325 14 -5 
20 POLAND 0.58 0.8 0.8 1.04 0.81 -0.478 19 -1 
21 LATVIA 0.4 0.79 1.1 0.82 0.78 -0.527 23 2 
22 SLOVAK REP. 0.15 0.48 0.84 0.97 0.61 -0.812 20 -2 
23 ITALY -0.05 0.25 0.45 1.01 0.42 -1.138 24 1 
24 HUNGARY 0.1 0.4 0.49 0.52 0.38 -1.203 21 -3 
25 CROATIA 0.2 0.2 0.51 0.5 0.35 -1.248 26 1 
26 GREECE -0.13 0.24 0.25 0.59 0.24 -1.444 25 -1 
27 ROMANIA -0.05 0.15 -0.04 0.43 0.12 -1.637 28 1 
28 BULGARIA -0.31 -0.12 0.22 0.39 0.04 -1.777 27 -1 
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Table 4: Summary of Regional EQI Indicators 
Pillar Variable Description Variable name 
Corruption Items       
perceptions       
  corruption in education stEdCorr 
  corruption in health care stHelCorr 
  corruption in law enforcement stLawCorr 
  need corruption   stNeedCorr 
  greed corruption   stGreedCorr 
  elections clean from corruption stElecCorr 
experiences       
  asked to pay a bribe for public service stnoAskB_any1 
  paid a bribe for public service stnopayB_any1 
          
Impartiality Items       
  some  get special advantages in education stEdImpart1 
  some  get special advantages in health care stHelImpart1 
  some get special advantages in law enforcement stLawImpart1 
  all treated equally in education stEdImpart2 
  all treated equally in health care stHelImpart2 
  all treated equally in law enforcement stLawImpart2 
   All treated fairly by tax authorities stTaxImpart 
          
Quality Items       
  quality of education   stEdQual 
  quality of health care   stHelQual 






In previous rounds, we then took the standardized sample mean for 2015 WGI data 
and set each country’s national average as such.   A key difference in this round 
(and retrospectively in other two rounds) we now aggregate to the WGI at 
the pillar levels of corruption impartiality and quality in order to better make 
use of these three distinct concepts empirically (as shown in Figure 1).  This also 
allows for the added advantage of more valid comparison of unit changes in each pillar 
over time.  The regional data itself combines 18 survey questions about QoG in the 
region, which are shown in Table 3. As noted, the questions are centered on three 
QoG concepts: ‘quality’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘corruption’. In building the regional index, 
we re-score each variable so that higher numbers equate to higher QoG and then the 
18 questions/indicators to three pillars based on factor analysis9 then we averaged 
these three pillars together to form the final index figure for each region. After each 
stage of aggregation, the data are standardized. For the seven EU28 countries outside 
of the regional survey, there is nothing to add to the WGI Country score, thus the WGI 
data is used as the QoG estimate alone, as regional variation is unobserved. With 
respect to countries with the regional data, we set the national average as the WGI for 
each of the three pillars10 and explain the within‐country variance using the regional‐
level data. The ‘roadmap’ so to speak of the aggregation process can be seen in Figure 
1. 
To begin, we aggregate the individual scores (‘survey question’) to the corresponding 
regional level, so that each of the 17 questions in the index is now a regional 
‘indicator’.  We test the overall consistency of the 17 indicators with the Cronbach’s 
Alpha, which was 0.934, showing high levels of association.  In addition, of the 153 
pairwise correlations, all but two are positive when items are re-scaled so that higher 
scores equal higher QoG (see appendix, table A2).  The two are between 
stnopayB_any1 and stEdImpart1, and stnopayB_any1 and stTaxImpart; yet neither 
negative pairwise correlation is significant (p value = 0.39 and 0.14 respectively).  
Next, factor analysis then groups the 18 indictors into more similar groupings, of 
which we find three.  After normalizing each of the 18 indicators (through z-score 
standardization) so that they share a common range, the 18 indicators are aggregated 
into the three groupings ‘pillars’.  The one exception is the corruption pillar that has 
one additional step – which contains two sub-pillars called ‘experience’ and 
‘perceptions’ which represent question items reflecting personal experience with petty 
corruption versus perception of corruption in various other areas.  These two sub-
pillars are aggregated using equal weighting.   The pillars are then aggregated into the 
regional index11. After each step of aggregation, the data is standardized.  
 
  
                                                 
9  Results of the factor analysis can factor weights are found in the appendix 2, Table A.3 of this paper.  In 
previous years, the underlying pillars were determined by the concepts, while in 2017, there were three 
clusters that were determined soley by the principle component analysis 
10  For corruption pillar, the regional estimates are centered round the ’control of corruption WGI score.  
For impartiality, the estimates are set around ‘government effectiveness’ WGI score.  The regional 
impartiality indicators are centered on the ‘rule of law’ and the regional ‘quality’ indicators are centered 
on the ‘voice and accountability’ and ‘government effectiveness’ WGI national scores.   
11  Nardo et al. (2008) point out that when combining multiple indicators into a single index, the underlying 
data should be significantly correlated.  We find that 98.5% of the pairwise correlations among the 
variables are significant and in the expected direction at the 99% level of confidence.  We show the 
results in Appendix 2, Table A.2. 
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Figure 1: EQI 2017 Roadmap 
 
Note: * represents the stage at which the regional data is centered on the national level WGI 
data. 
 
For data for the regional pillars’ score for each of the countries included in the 2017 
regional survey, weighting each region’s score by their share of the national 
population. This figure is thus used to explain regional variation only within each 
country included (not absolute levels of QoG).  We then subtract this mean score from 
each region’s individual pillar score from the regional study, which shows if the region 
is above or below its national average and by how much. This figure is then added to 
the national level, WGI data, so each region has an adjusted score for each of the 
three pillars, centered on the respective WGI indicators. It is worth mentioning that 
none of the regional variation from the regional index is lost during this merging 
process; the country mean of all regional scores is simply adjusted.  The formula 
employed is the following:  
𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑋 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑌 =  𝑊𝐺𝐼𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑌 + (𝑅𝑞𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑋 𝑖𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑌 − 𝐶𝑅𝑞𝑜𝑔𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑌) 
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where ‘EQI’ is the final score from each region or country in each pillar –corruption, 
impartiality and quality - of the EQI. ‘WGI’ is the World Bank’s national average for 
each country for each pillar, while ‘Rqog’ is each region’s score from the regional 
survey and ‘CRqog’ is the country average (weighted by regional population) of all 
regions within the country from the regional survey for each pillar. The EQI pillars are 
standardized so that the mean is ‘0’ with a standard deviation of ‘1’.  The three pillar 
scores are then aggregated using equal weighting. 
A full list of the EQI for 2017 for all countries and regions is located in Appendix 1.  As 
in the results for 2010 and 2013, we find that in several cases, the data show 
significant and wide variations in QoG within countries (Italy, Belgium, Spain and 
Bulgaria for example), while others show little to no variation in regional QoG 
(Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Slovakia).   
 
5. Margins of Error for the EQI 2017 
As we reported for 2010, we construct margins of error for the regional estimates, 
similar to the authors of the WGI report ‘margins of error’ around each of the QoG 
variables that they publish annually.   The idea is to construct a type of margin of 
error around the regional estimates so that we can say with some degree of certainty 
that region ‘x’s higher QoG score is in fact ‘significantly’ higher than region ‘y’s score.   
As noted, the regional QoG index is based on data from a randomly selected group of 
respondents in each of the 185 regions.  Since this is an estimate of the total 
population, we provide some sence of the uncertainaty around the data point.  
Although, in theory, any number can be chosen, we select a margin of error at the 
95% confidence level.   After obtaining the margin of error based on our sample size, 
we then can calculate the distance around the estimates of QoG for each region.   
To be precise, there are two ways to go about calculating the margin of error for 
survey data – an ‘exact’ confidence interval and an ‘approximate’ confidence interval.  
The former takes into account both sampling and non-sampling errors, while the latter 
only random sampling errors.  While the ‘exact’ interval may be more precise, we find 
the advantages of the ‘approximate’ confidence interval to far outweigh the 
drawbacks, in particular with respect to the efficiency and time saved in the 
calculation.  Moreover, we have no reason to suspect that there is any bias in certain 
groups being excluded or not being forthright in their responses, so compensating for 
such error is simply beyond our reach.  Thus we report an ‘approximate’ confidence 
interval for each region’s QoG estimate.   
We begin by assuming a normal distribution of the sample so that we may use the 
Central Limit Theorem.  We know from basic statistical probability that in a sample ‘x’, 
95% of the area of a basic normal Bell curve are between our estimates (µ) 1.96+/- 
the standard error around µ.  We calculate the standard error as: S.E. = n

. The 










 with N = 18, because there are 18 indicators in the QoG index which 
have been aggregated from the survey data.   
As shown in Figure 5, each region will have their own individual margin of error based 
on the consistency of the estimates for each of the 18 aggregated questions in the 
survey.  Regions where aggregate responses to the QoG questions are inconsistent 
(e.g. citizens feel that that the services are impartial, but lack good quality) will have 
higher margins of error than those regions where citizens rated the quality, 
impartiality and corruption at a consistently high (or moderate or low) level.   




Figure 2: EQI in Rank order with Regional Margins of Error 
 
 
The mean margin of error by region is 0.31 with a standard deviation of 0.10.  The 
three regions with the greatest level of consistency are Burenland (AT11), Voralberg 
(AT32) and East Midland (UKF) with 0.14, 0.15 and 0.16 respectively.  The three 
regions with the margins of error around their estimates are the two Croatian regions 
(HR03 and HR04) and Southern Transdanubia (HU22) with 0.57, 0.55 and 0.54 
respectively.  Figure 2 shows the full range of countries and regions with confidence 
intervals around the estimates of the EQI 201312 The highest ranked region is the 
small, island, Swedish speaking Finish region of Åland, which shows to be a positive 
outlier; while the region of Severozapad (BG31) is ranked lowest.   
 
6. Testing the Uncertainty of the Estimates 
In this section, we summarize a number of alternative simulations that were done to 
the index in order to test how sensitive the results are to our model assumptions and 
specifications.  Specifically, we examine the effects of alternative weighting schemes, 
aggregation methods, standardization and exclusion of individual indicators in the 
index to test how close the results resemble the final ones reported.   
In the 2017 version of the EQI, the method is now to center the regional indicators 
around national estimates for each of the three pillars – corruption, impartiality and 
quality – and thus to elucidate as clear results as possible, we undergo sensitivity 
                                                 
12  Due to the fact that the margins of error are constructed using the regional data, there are no confidence 
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analyses for each of the three pillars.  In sum, the following adjustments are 
considered – testing the sensitivity with all possible combinations 
 
Table 4 : Alternative Construction Scenarios to Test Uncertainty 
model weighting aggregation 
excluded 
indicators standardization micro to macro adjustments 
original EQI equal arithmetic none z-score none 
alterantives factor geometric 
all - one at a 
time min-max 
aggregate using gender & age 
weights 
     
aggregate exclusing high 
education 
     
aggregate exclusing low education 
 
 
6.1 Corruption pillar 
Table 5 shows the top 10 most divergent scenarios from the final EQI corruption pillar 
estimates.  The tables shows the various ways in which the original EQI roadmap has 
been altered, along with the median shift in regional rank and the region with the 
greatest shift in rank due to the alteration and the direction of that shift.   
In general, we observe that the corruption pillar is quite stable and robust to 
alterations. The Spearman rank coefficient is above 0.95 in all cases, and only in the 
simulation least like the original corruption pillar results do we see the Spearman rank 
drop below 0.96.  The median shift in rank ranges between five and eight for the 10 
most deviant scenarios in Table 5, which is relatively small given that there are 193 
regions in the sample.   
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Table 5: Results of Sensitivity Testing for Regional Level Data in Corruption 
Pillar 
Scenario Aggregation Weighting Excluded  micro-macro Normalization Median Max Max Spearman 
          
Rank     Indicator adjustment Method shift shift Region 
Rank 
Coefficient 




Arithmetic Equal none none Standardized 0 0 0 1 
1 Arithmetic Equal Pay bribe 
Gender & 
age weights 
Standardized 5 102 (-) 
Valle d’Aosta 
(IT) 0.958 




3 Arithmetic Equal Pay bribe none min-max 5 102(-) 
Valle d’Aosta 
(IT) 0.961 
4 Arithmetic Factor none 
drop high 
ed. 
Standardized 8 88(-) 
Valle d’Aosta 
(IT) 0.962 
5 Arithmetic Factor none drop low ed. Standardized 6 108(-) 
Valle d’Aosta 
(IT) 0.962 
6 Arithmetic Factor none 
Gender & 
age weights 
Standardized 7 87(-) 
Valle d’Aosta 
(IT) 0.965 
7 Arithmetic Equal Ask bribe 
Gender & 
age weights 
Standardized 6 104(+) 
Valle d’Aosta 
(IT) 0.966 
8 Geometric Factor none 
drop high 
ed. 
Standardized 7 108 (-) 
Valle d’Aosta 
(IT) 0.967 





10 Geometric Equal Ask bribe none Standardized 6 70 (+) 
Strední Cechy 
(CZ) 0.969 
Note: total of 193 regions, with 1st scenario representing the final index.  These are the 10 
scenarios LEAST like the aggregated regional Corruption index used to build the EQI.  Median 






There are a few outlying regions that are highly affected by alterations to the EQI 
index assumptions however.  Namely, the region of Valle d’Aosta (ITC2) is highly 
sensitive to several of the alterations, moving at times over 100 places in the 
rankings.  For example removing certain experience indicators of corruption, and 
making changes in the aggregation process from the micro to macro level. Other 
regions that make substantial shifts in ranks (between 35 and 70 places) in certain 
alternative simulations are Strední Cechy (CZ02), Jihozapad (CZ06), Haute-Normandie 
(FRD2), and Nyugat-Dunántúl (HU22).  Figure 3 shows the scatterplot of the 
simulation with the lowest Spearman Rank coefficient compared with the original 
corruption pillar, highlighting regions that moved 50 places or more in the rankings. 
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6.2 Impartiality  






















Arithmetic Equal none none z-score 0 0 0 1 
1 Arithmetic Factor Edimpart2 none min-max 5  27 (-) 
Strední Cechy 
(CZ) 0.975 
2 Arithmetic Equal TaxImpart none min-max  5 31(-) 
Severoiztochen 
(BG) 0.981 
3 Arithmetic Equal Edimpart2 none min-max  5 17 (-) 
Nisia Aigaiou, 
Kriti (EL) 0.982 
4 Arithmetic Equal LawImpart1 
Gender & age 
weights 
z-score  4 24 (+) 
Nord Vest 
(RO) 0.982 
5 Arithmetic Equal Edimpart2 none z-score  5 20 (+) 
Észak-Alföld 
(HU) 0.982 
6 Arithmetic Equal TaxImpart none z-score  4 28 (-) 
Yugoiztochen 
(BG) 0.982 
7 Arithmetic Factor TaxImpart none min-max 4  30 (-) 
Yugoiztochen 
(BG) 0.982 
8 Arithmetic Equal LawImpart1 none min-max  4 21 (+) 
Nord Vest 
(RO) 0.984 
9 Arithmetic Equal LawImpart1 none min-max  5 22 (+) 
Nord Vest 
(RO) 0.984 
10 Arithmetic Factor LawImpart2 none min-max  4 22 (+) Brussels (BE) 0.985 
Note: total of 193 regions, with 1st scenario representing the final index.  These are 
the 10 scenarios LEAST like the aggregated regional Impartiality index used to build 
the EQI.  Median shift is absolute median shift.  
 
Table 6 reports a similar rank table of the ten most divergent cases from the original 
impartiality pillar.  In this pillar, we observe much more stability than in corruption.  
All Spearman rank coefficient are 0.975 or above, and the median shifts are all 
between four and five places for the ten most divergent cases. The most drastic shift 
occurs for the region Severoiztochen (BG33), which drops 31 places when dropping 
the tax authority impartiality item (TaxImpart) and using min-max standardization.  
Otherwise, even the max shift does not exceed 30 places in most scenarios.  Figure X 
shows the scatterplot with original and most divergent impartiality scenario, 
















Table 7: Results of Sensitivity Testing for Regional Level Data in Quality Pillar 
Scenario Aggregation Weighting Excluded  micro-macro Normalization Median Max Max Spearman 
Rank     Indicator adjustment Method shift shift Region 
Rank 
Coefficient 




Arithmetic Equal none none z-score 0 0 0 1 
1 Arithmetic Equal HelQual 
gender & age 
weights 
z-score 7 56 (+) Dél-Dunántúl (HU) 
0.930 
2 Arithmetic Factor HelQual none min-max 9 50 (+) Dél-Alföld (HU) 0.930 
3 Arithmetic Equal EdQual 
gender & age 
weights 
z-score 7 96 (-) 
Border, Midland & 
Western (IE) 0.931 
4 Arithmetic Equal HelQual none min-max 8 50 (+) Dél-Alföld (HU) 0.931 
5 Arithmetic Equal HelQual none z-score 8 48 (+) 
Southern & Eastern 
(IE) 0.934 
6 Arithmetic Equal EdQual none min-max 8 94 (-) 
Border, Midland & 
Western (IE) 0.941 
7 Arithmetic Factor EdQual none min-max 8 94 (-) 
Border, Midland & 
Western (IE) 0.941 
8 Arithmetic Factor EdQual none z-score 8 93 (-) 
Border, Midland & 
Western (IE) 0.947 
9 Arithmetic Factor LawQual none min-max 8 42 (-) Dél-Alföld (HU) 0.949 
10 Arithmetic Equal LawQual 
gender & age 
weights 
z-score 8 41 (-) 
Dél-Alföld (HU) 0.951 
Note: total of 193 regions, with 1st scenario representing the final index.  These are the 10 
scenarios LEAST like the aggregated regional Quality index used to build the EQI.  Median shift 
is absolute median shift.  
 
Table 7 shows the summary of the ten most divergent cases for the quality pillar.  On 
whole the quality pillar is slightly more sensitive to the alterations, most likely due to 
the fact there are only three items that make up the pillar, compared with seven 
impartiality and eight corruption items respectively.  Thus the removal of one of the 
indicators represents a larger proportional changes in the underlying data than any 
removal of a single item from the previous two pillars.   
On whole the Spearman Rank coefficient shows quite similar rankings compared with 
the original EQI pillar, with the two most divergent scenarios dropping to roughly 
0.93.  All others are above 0.93 however.  The median shifts range between 7-9 
places for these ten most diverging scenarios, with the two Irish regions showing the 
most sensitivity to the alterations, along with the Hungarian region of Dél-Alföld 
(HU33) and the capital region of Madrid making significant shifts at times as well.  
Figure X shows the most divergent scenario and labels regions with a shift of 40 or 





Figure 5 : Most Deviant Scenario : Quality Pillar 
 
 
Finally, as respondents were contact via two forms of telephone – landlines and mobile 
phones, we examine the extent to which one’s type of telephone contact has any 
systematic relationship with higher or lower repsonses to the main questions. 
Table 8 shows the proportion of mobile rspondents per country, ranging from 0.237 
(23.7%) in Germany to 1 (all respondents) in Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary.  
While cannot investiage the effects of telephone-type in the latter three member 
states, in which all repsondents were mobile users, we can do so in the other countries 
where we have variation.   
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In Figure 6, we show the summary results of multiple regression analyses, in which we 
test whether the binary variable ‘mobile’ has a systematic effect on individual’s 
repsonses to the EQI questions.  For the sake of parsimony, we combine the questions 
to the pillar level – quality, impartilaity and corruption - using equal weighting, such 
that the scores are continuous range between 0.1 to 1, with higher scores equating to 
higher QoG assessments in all cases.   
To avoid potentially misleading results, we include a number of potentially 
confounding covariates at the individual level and include regional dummy variable 
and survey design weights.  Further, for more precision, we analysis the data by 
country.  The model we test is the following: 
𝑄𝑜𝐺𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑒) + 𝛽2..𝑛(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠) + 𝜑𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖 
Whereby an individual’s assessment of the three QoG pillars - quality, impartiality and 
corruption – are a function of their telephone type, a set of individual level standard 
controls (gender, age, education, income, population of residence and employment 
status) along with regional fixed effects at the NUTS level sampled in each country 𝜑𝑟 





Figure 6 : Summary of Telephone-type on QoG assessments by pillar and 
country 
 
Note : dots are estimated marginal effects of mobile contact (landline=reference 
category).  Lines are 95% confidence intervals around the estimate from robust 
standard errors.  Larger confidence intervals are due to sample size and percentage 
mobile use.  Lines that cross the red horizontal lines (at ‘0’) imply that the responses 
are statistically indistinguishable between landline and mobile respondents.  
The Figure shows the results of 54 OLS models, whereby the dots show the marginal 
effect of mobile telephone-type on the combined set of EQI pillar questions by pillar.  
Estimates that are positive (negative) imply that mobile uses assessed higher (lower) 
QoG on average for that respective pillar.  The estimates have a 95% confidence 
interval, which if it crosses the red horizontal line at ‘0’, implies that the effect is 
negliable.   
We find that in the vast majority of cases, telephone type plays no role on QoG 
assessments.  Of the 54 models estimated, we find that in 85% of the cases (46 of 54, 
or in 14 of the 18 countries tested), the effect is insignificant (e.g. p>0.05).  In eight 
cases, the effect of mobile use is shown to have a significant association with QoG 
assessments.  The effect is not uniform however.  The estimates colored in red show a 
significant negative effect, while those in blue show a positive one.  We observe the 
case of the quality pillar, only mobile users in Poland rate the quality signifncatly lower 
(𝛽1 = -0.025).  French and Portuguese mobile respondents tend to score their services 
as less impartial and more corrupt on average, while Polish mobile users also rate 
their services as more corrupt than landline users.  On the oher hand, mobile 
repsondents in Romania tend to rate their services as more impartila and less corrupt 
than those who repsonded via landline.   
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7. Final Index: Regional variation of EQI and External Valididty Checks 
For the sake of space, all EQI, pillar and margin of error estimates are listed in Table 
A2 in the appendix of this document.  Figure 6 summarizes the final index; showing 
the countries in rank order from top to bottom on the y-axis and regional variation on 
the x-axis.  As with the 2013 EQI index, the Swedish speaking Finish island region of 
Åland is an outlier on the top of the index ranking.    
Figure 7: Countries in Rank Order and Regional Variation of 2017 EQI 
 
Note: highest regional score in each country with regional data labeled via NUTS code.   
The following three figures show the results of the EQI index for the three years of 
data.  The previous two years have been re-calculated with the current methodology 






Figure 8: EQI 2017 
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Figure 10: EQI 2010 
 
 
In Table 8 we report results from a simple pairwise correlation test with the EQI, its 
pillars and several alternative measures with which we would expect the EQI to 
correlate.  The first group of measures are that which also measure some aspect of 
institutional quality at the regional level.  One, we take the OECD’s’ Regions at a 
Glance’ report (2016) which tracks the percentage of citizens who believe their 
government is corrupt from surveys since 2006-2014.  The CRI and ‘% single bids’ 
come from Fazekas and Koscis (2017) which track the risk of grand corruption in 
public procurement and have aggregated their data to the exact regional level in the 
EQI sample. The final measure is one that tracks the extent to which civil servants 
rate their place of employment as meritocratic (as opposed to clientalist) at the 
regional level in EU countries, from 2013 (Charron et al 2013). 
Next, we check the correlation with likely covariates from the literature – namely, the 
proportion of people in a region that ‘trust others’ (social trust, from Charron and 
Rothstein 2018), gender equality in the form of the percentage of women in local 
parliaments by region (Sundström 2014), the percentage of residents who are at risk 
of poverty and the level of economic development (PPP per capita, logged from 2012), 
the latter two measures are taken from Eurostat.  
We find strong evidence of external validity for the measure. In particular, we see 
strong correlation with the alternative measure of corruption perceptions from the 
OECD, both the EQI measure on whole and especially in the EQI’s corruption pillar 
(0.85). The measures of grand corruption risk also are highly correlated and 
significant with the EQI and all pillars (p<0.001).  The measure of public sector 
meritocracy correlates with the EQI at 0.69.   
In addition, we find that the outside covariates of other socio-economic indicators are 
all significantly correlated with the EQI and in the expected direction. Regions with 




quality government institutions, while the EQI and its pillars are negatively correlated 
with risk of poverty.   
 
Table 9: Pairwise correlations of EQI and Pillar with Additional Measures 
 
variable EQI 2017 Quality Impartiality Corruption 
2017 EQI and Pillar data   
   
 
EQI  1.00 
   
 
Quality 0.95 1.00 
  
 
Impartiality 0.97 0.89 1.00 
 
 
Corruption 0.96 0.87 0.92 1.00 
alternative measures of regional QoG   
   
 
corruption perceptions (OECD) 0.81 0.72 0.76 0.85 
 
corruption risk indicator (CRI) -0.55 -0.52 -0.51 -0.55 
 
% single bids -0.65 -0.59 -0.63 -0.66 
 
meritocracy in public sector 0.69 0.65 0.67 0.66 
socio-economic covariates   
   
 
social trust (2013) 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.50 
 
% women in local parl. 0.44 0.47 0.40 0.41 
 
% poverty risk -0.42 -0.44 -0.43 -0.35 
 
PPP per capita (logged, 2012) 0.60 0.61 0.58 0.53 
 
Note : pairwise Pearson correlation coeffiecnets reported.  
 
Figure 11 highlights the relationship between the OECD’s measure of corruption 
perceptions (citizen based) and our EQI corruption pillar via a scatterplot.  The OECD’s 
measure, which is temporally prior and focus only on one aspect of corruption – 
whether the government is perceived as corruption – explains roughly 72% of the 
variation in the EQI corruption pillar. 
 
  









8. General Observable patters over time 
QoG tends to be stable over time.  EQI index correlations coefficients across years are 
all over 0.9, as shown in Table 9.  Moreover, the correlations among the pillars are 
also above 0.80.  Further analysis in the subsequent section show that just 11.5% and 
16.9% of units in the sample have had a significant change (p<0.05 or p<0.10 
respectively) in score (positive or negative) during the time span. This finding is quite 
consistent with country level data that shows that time trends in governance are 
remarkably ‘sticky’ (Andersson and Heywood 2009).  However, we observe that the 

































          impartity 
2017 0.973 0.893 
         corruption 
2017 0.965 0.870 0.920 
        EQI 2013 0.938 0.894 0.914 0.907 
       quality 
2013 0.906 0.887 0.875 0.859 0.971 
      impartity 
2013 0.919 0.868 0.907 0.883 0.978 0.927 
     corruption 
2013 0.918 0.858 0.889 0.909 0.973 0.913 0.934 
    EQI 2010 0.913 0.862 0.903 0.875 0.953 0.922 0.936 0.927 
   quality 
2010 0.873 0.843 0.858 0.824 0.928 0.922 0.902 0.887 0.967 
  impartity 
2010 0.885 0.827 0.887 0.844 0.907 0.863 0.914 0.873 0.973 0.910 
 corruption 
2010 0.900 0.839 0.884 0.880 0.939 0.898 0.909 0.939 0.971 0.905 0.922 
Note: Pearson’s pairwise correlation coefficient reported.  All correlations sig p<0.001 
 
Geography still matters: yet a bit less so in 2017 than in 2010.  In the earliest round 
of the EQI, we observed a clear East-West pattern whereby all regions and countries 
of the former socialist bloc were below the EU28 mean in the EQI, with southern EU15 
states and regions (albeit more spread out in some cases) in the next group, followed 
by a group of strong performing northern countries and regions.  While this pattern to 
a large degree persists, there are several cases where we observe that areas from 
newer member state (NMS13) have risen above the mean score: the Czech regions of 
Jihovychod (CZ06), Stredni Morava (CZ07) and the country of Estonia (EE).  
Moreover, several other regions have made considerable progress in governance 
convergence, namely Prague region (CZ01); several regions in Poland and Lithuania 
have all progressed near the EU28 average.  On the other hand, while the Northern 
parts of the EU28 have remained strong, the south of Europe has slid, led by decline 
in Italian, Greek and some Spanish regions, yet Portugal has made some slight 
increases since 2010.   
Countries with lower QoG tend to have wider divergence of QoG at the sub-national 
level.  This is an observed trend that has remained since 2010.  Top performers, such 
as Finland, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands show no significant regional 
variation (Åland (FI20) is an exception as it is an outlier in scoring so high).  And 
despite being federal countries, places like Germany and Austria have much less 
regional variation in their QoG than countries like Bulgaria or Czech Republic which are 
more politically and fiscally centralized (Hooghe, Marks and Schakel 2010).  Countries 
at or below the EU mean for the EQI tend to be the ones with the largest regional 
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variation – Italy, Spain, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Portugal (in some cases), with 
Belgium and France being somewhat exceptional in this case.  A counter example is 
also Poland, which has 16 provinces with political significance, clear East/West/South 
historical differences in culture and development, yet has consistently shown 
moderate levels of regional variation.  However, the northern region of Pomorskie 
(PL63) has made improvements and is significantly stronger than most other Polish 
provinces in the data. 
Countries with persistent and large gaps in QoG: Italy, Belgium and France.  In these 
cases, there is a clear geographic divide - north-south In Italy and Belgium in 
particular - that persists in each of the three rounds and is highly significant according 
to our margin of error calculations.  In Belgium in all cases, the Flemish speaking 
region of Vlaams Gewest (BE2) outperforms the Wallonie (BE3) region as well as the 
capital region of Brussels (BE1).  BE2 stands out in particular with citizen satisfaction 
of the quality of public services and how they are delivered impartiality, as this region 
is an EU28 leader on several indicators, while the other two regions are near or below 
the EU mean on such indicators.  In the case of Italy, the south is a consistent low 
performer both within Italy and throughout the EU28, while the Northern regions, in 
particular the smaller Alpine regions of Trento, Bolzano, Friuli and Valle d’Aosta, are 
consistently higher performers on all underlying items and are above or just below the 
EU28 mean score.  Although in the 2017 round we do observe a small trend of 
convergence, as the northern regions show a modest decline. In France we observe a 
stand-out region in each of the three rounds: Bretagne, with the western part of the 
country in the next group of region, followed by the northeast and southern regions 
with the overseas regions lagging significantly behind.   
Countries with growing divergence in QoG: Spain and Czech Republic.  The 2017 data 
show a widening gap in the regions of the Czech Republic, and even more so in Spain.  
For the latter, Spain is now the country with the second most regional variation in the 
data (behind Italy).  In fact, while the country average in the WGI declined by 0.27 
(resulting in a drop of 6 places in the national rankings) and many regions showed 
declining score in particular in the south (Andalucía, Valencia), several northern 
regions showed improvement in their EQI scores (Cantabria, Navarra, Pais Vasco).  
Czech Republic showed several regions with significant improvement – Prague (CZ01), 
Jihovychod (CZ06), Stredni Morava (CZ07), while the border region of Severozapd 
(CZ04) has consistently lagged behind and  
 
9. Systematic Tests of Time Trends 
In this section, we seek to identify if units have shown a significant trend in a positive 
or negative direction in the data over time.   This is useful to identify potentially 
interesting case studies and to investigate policy ideas from recent success cases.  The 
data have been organized into a panel dataset for all regions covered with three years 
each.  While three years in a panel data set per observation is of course difficult to 
identify a clear trend, even based on limited observations, we can do a simple test 
that can help us reveal and possible time trends in the data.  We begin with a simple 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) test in Table 10 to determine whether significant 
changes have occurred within groups over time.  For this, we run an ANOVA test with 
an interaction term between the year and a dummy variable for each region (along 














Adj. R2 0.960 
       







(df) MS F-stat. Prob>F 
Model 
 
571.589 382 1.496 36.48 0.000 
       Year 
 
0.024 2 0.012 0.30 0.744 
Regional dummy 15.685 190 0.083 2.01 0.000 
Reg. dummy#year 15.673 190 0.082 2.01 0.000 
       Residual  7.793 190 0.041   
Total 
 
579.381 572 1.013 
   
The results in the above table show that there is significant variance within the regions 
over time, as the interaction term between regional dummy variables and time is 
significant (p=0.000).  We now proceed to time series data regression in order to 
elucidate which regions in fact have made such significant changes and in which 
direction the change was made.   
The regression model is specified as the following: 
𝐸𝑄𝐼𝑟𝑡 = 𝜑𝑟𝑁𝑟 + 𝜃𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽𝑟(𝑁𝑟 ∗ 𝑡) + 𝜀𝑟𝑡                                                      (1) 
 
Where EQI is the index used to capture institutional quality in region (or country) r in 
the year t (r = 1, 2,…. r, and t = 0, 1, and 2, which equate to 2010, 2013 and 2017), 
and where 𝑁𝑟 = 1 for region r and 0 if otherwise, and 𝜀𝑟𝑡 the error term. The constant 
term is omitted.  This model can be estimated with simple ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression, where 𝜑𝑟elucidates fixed spatial differences in levels of the EQI and 
𝜃𝑟 captures the fixed time effects (e.g. a year count).  The interaction term (𝑁𝑟 ∗ 𝑡) 
thus captures temporal trends in the EQI for each region.  As regards time trends 
within regions over time, the null hypothesis states that there are no significant time 
trends (e.g. 𝛽𝑟is insignificant). Where we observe significant trends (positive or 
negative) from the baseline year, such regions can be considered to have made a 
significant change in governance.  The interpretation of 𝛽𝑟 is thus the average 
marginal change in the EQI for each region over the two years since the baseline year 
of 2010.    
Table 12 reports the results for those regions where we observe a positive significant 
result (p <0.10).  Regions in darker blue shade have made a positive trend at p<0.05, 
while regions in lighter blue shade have made a change at the 90% level of 
confidence.  We observe that 14 regions made a significant positive change at the 
95% level of confidence (or greater) and eight regions made a change at the 90% 
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level of confidence.  Several Bulgarian and Romanian regions have made positive 
advances in the data over time, mainly due to their very low rank in the first year.  
For example, Bucharest had the second lowest score (-2.84) in 2010, and increase to 
-2.46 and -1.58 in 2013 and 2017 respectively.  While this constitutes an increase by 
about 1.25 standard deviations, the region still remains in the bottom 10 percentile of 
regions in the sample.  Similar patterns also describe the other Romanian and 
Bulgarian regions on this list.  Other regions, such as Prague, Pomorskie, Lithuania 
and Jihovychod, have made more substantial climbs in the data.  Prague, for example 
has moved from -1.02 to -0.55 to -0.14 in the three respective years, going from the 
bottom 15th%ile to near the median.  Lithuania is the only country to make a 
significant advance in this time period according to the data, an improvement that 
certainly warrants further investigation.  Several regions from the EU15 are also on 
this top list, including Bayern, London, West Midlands and Hessen.   
Near the 90% level of significance is also the region of Navarra (not shown), which is 
one of the most interesting.  Despite the negative trend in country average of Spain 
over time, as well as the negative decline in many of the (Southern) Spanish regions, 
Navarra (as well as Cantabria and Pais Vasco), has in fact shown steady improvement 
over time from 0.07 to 0.26 to 0.51 in the three years of the data.    
 
Table 12: list of regions with significant positive changes in EQI 
Source sum of squares d.f. MS 
 
obs 600 
model 589.17 399 1.48 
 
F (399, 200) 34.76 
residual 8.49 200 0.042 
 
pr > F 0.0000 
total 597.66 
   
R2 0.9858 
     
Adj R2 0.9574 
     







number Nuts code Region name Beta t-score p value 
1 RO32 Bucharesti 0.671 3.95 0.000 
2 BG32 Severen tsentralen 0.642 3.78 0.000 
3 CZ01 Prague 0.468 2.75 0.003 
4 RO42 Vest 0.467 2.75 0.003 
5 PL63 Pomorskie 0.420 2.47 0.010 
6 LT Lithuania 0.404 2.38 0.010 
7 DE2 Bayern 0.385 2.27 0.016 
8 RO31 Sud-Muntenia 0.373 2.19 0.016 
9 CZ07 Střední Morava 0.369 2.17 0.021 
10 PL22 Slaskie 0.361 2.13 0.024 
11 PL61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie 0.360 2.12 0.024 
12 PL51 Dolnoslaskie 0.359 2.11 0.033 
13 UKI London 0.357 2.10 0.034 
14 CZ06 Jihovychod 0.348 2.05 0.037 
15 PL41 Wielkopolskie 0.317 1.86 0.059 
16 PL42 Zachodniopomorskie 0.313 1.84 0.067 
17 PL43 Lubuskie 0.309 1.82 0.070 
18 PL34 Podlaskie 0.301 1.77 0.073 
19 PL21 Małopolskie 0.296 1.74 0.079 
20 DE7 Hessen 0.291 1.71 0.082 
21 PL12 Mazowieckie 0.286 1.68 0.085 
22 UKG W. Midlands 0.284 1.67 0.089 
 
On the other side of the coin, nine regions made a negative change at the 90% level 
of confidence or greater, shown in Table 13.  We see a significant decline in 
governance assessments in several Italian regions, mostly in the north and central 
part of the country.  In addition, Hungary, Spain and France (overseas regions) and 
the Greek capital region of Athens have regions that have seen a significant decline in 
their EQI scores over time, with the overseas French region of Guyane showing the 
largest decline in the data.    
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Table 13: list of regions with significant negative changes in EQI 
Source sum of squares d.f. MS 
 
obs 600 
model 589.17 399 1.48 
 
F (399, 200) 34.76 
residual 8.49 200 0.042 
 
pr > F 0.0000 
total 597.66 
   
R2 0.9858 
     
Adj R2 0.9574 
     
Root MSE 0.2061 
 
Number Nuts code Region name Beta t-score p value 
1 FR93 Guyane -0.512 -3.02 0.000 
2 ITC2 Valle d'Aosta -0.499 -2.93 0.000 
3 ITF1 Abruzzo -0.431 -2.54 0.001 
4 ITC1 Piemonte -0.394 -2.32 0.003 
5 ES70 Canarias -0.396 -2.33 0.004 
6 EL3 Athens -0.394 -2.32 0.005 
7 ES11 Galicia -0.391 -2.3 0.005 
8 HU32 Észak-Alföld -0.333 -1.96 0.009 
9 RO11 Nord Vest -0.287 -1.69 0.033 
 
Figure 12 highlights the results of the previous two tables in the map below.  In the 
darker (lighter) blue shades, are the regions with a p-value for positive significance of 
𝛽𝑟 at 0.05 (0.10) or less.  In the darker (lighter) red shaded regions are the regions 





Figure 12: map of regions with a significant change in EQI 
 
 
In the next two tables, we highlight all significant changes – positive and negative 
respectively – in the three pillars.  Similar color shades are used to distinguish 
significance levels for the regions in each pillar. 
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Table 14: Positive Changes in individual EQI pillars 
 
Nuts code Region name Beta t-score p value 
QUALITY           
  BG32 Severen tsentralen 0.816 3.69 0.000 
  DE2 Bayern 0.594 2.69 0.008 
  ITC4 Lombardia 0.514 2.32 0.021 
  ES30 Madrid 0.499 2.26 0.025 
  ES23 La Rioja 0.471 2.13 0.034 
  BG34 Yugoiztochen 0.452 2.04 0.042 
  UKI London 0.122 2.32 0.022 
  LT Lithuania 0.388 1.76 0.080 
  CZ01 Prague 0.388 1.75 0.081 
  PL34 Podlaskie 0.381 1.72 0.086 
  ITF4 Puglia 0.381 1.72 0.087 
  RO31 Sud-Muntenia 0.379 1.71 0.088 
IMPARTIALITY         
  RO42 Vest 0.793 3.34 0.001 
  RO32 Bucharesti 0.762 3.21 0.002 
  PL63 Pomorskie 0.684 2.88 0.004 
  PL61 Kujawsko-Pomorskie 0.631 2.66 0.008 
  CZ07 Střední Morava 0.603 2.54 0.012 
  BG32 Severen tsentralen 0.566 2.39 0.018 
  CZ06 Jihovychod 0.527 2.22 0.027 
  ITF2 Molise 0.489 2.06 0.040 
  CZ01 Prague 0.479 2.02 0.045 
 
DE7  Hessen 0.478 2.02 0.045 
 
PL51 Dolnoslaskie 0.476 2.01 0.046 
 
PL22 Slaskie 0.462 1.95 0.053 
 
PL43 Lubuskie 0.459 1.93 0.055 
 
CZ05 Severovýchod 0.450 1.90 0.059 
 





ES13 Cantabria 0.431 1.82 0.071 
 
PL22 Slaskie 0.431 1.82 0.071 
 
PL62 Warmińsko-mazurskie 0.428 1.80 0.073 
 
BG41 Yugozapaden 0.427 1.80 0.073 
 
DE2 Bayern 0.400 1.69 0.093 
 
BE1 Brussels 0.394 1.66 0.098 
CORRUPTION         
 
RO32 Bucharesti 0.989 4.79 0.000 
 
BG32 Severen tsentralen 0.496 2.40 0.017 
 
CZ01 Prague 0.494 2.39 0.018 
 
PL42 Zachodniopomorskie 0.448 2.17 0.031 
 
LT Lithuania 0.430 2.08 0.038 
 
PL41 Wielkopolskie 0.420 2.03 0.043 
 
PL22 Slaskie 0.415 2.01 0.046 
 
ITF6 Calabria 0.410 1.98 0.049 
 
RO42 Vest 0.387 1.87 0.063 
 
BE3 Wallonie 0.385 1.86 0.064 
 
RO31 Sud-Muntenia 0.365 1.77 0.078 
 
UKI London 0.362 1.75 0.081 
 
BE1 Brussels 0.358 1.74 0.084 
 
CZ06 Jihovychod 0.350 1.69 0.092 
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Table 15: Negative Changes in individual EQI pillars 
 
Nuts code Region name Beta t-score p value 
QUALITY           
 
FR93 Guyane -1.210 -5.47 0.000 
 
ITC2 Valle d'Aosta -1.139 -5.15 0.000 
 
ITF1 Abruzzo -0.803 -3.63 0.000 
 
HU31 Észak-Magyarország -0.542 -2.45 0.015 
 
AT11 Burgenland -0.533 -2.41 0.017 
 
UKN N. Ireland -0.506 -2.29 0.023 
 
DE3 Berlin -0.531 -2.40 0.017 
 
FR91 Martinique -0.486 -2.20 0.029 
 
FR92 Guyane -0.479 -2.17 0.031 
 
HU21 Közép-Dunántúl -0.406 -1.84 0.068 
 
ES70 Canarias -0.432 -1.96 0.052 
 
BG33 Severoiztochen -0.387 -1.75 0.081 
 
FR22 Picardie -0.379 -1.71 0.088 
 
FR43 Franche-Comté -0.376 -1.70 0.091 
IMPARTIALITY         
 
FR93 Guyane -0.639 -2.70 0.008 
 
HU32 Észak-Alföld -0.468 -1.97 0.050 
 
ITC1 Piemonte -0.452 -1.91 0.058 
 
ES11 Galacia -0.410 -1.73 0.085 
CORRUPTION         
 
ITF1 Abruzzo -0.756 -3.66 0.000 
 
ES11 Galacia -0.580 -2.81 0.005 
 
ITC3 Liguria -0.493 -2.39 0.018 
 
ES30 Madrid -0.484 -2.34 0.020 
 
ITF5 Basilicata -0.460 -2.23 0.027 
 
ES70 Canarias -0.437 -2.11 0.036 
 
BG34 Yugoiztochen -0.425 -2.06 0.041 
 





ITC2 Valle d'Aosta -0.416 -2.02 0.045 
 
RO11 Nord Vest -0.408 -1.97 0.050 
 
AT21 Kärnten -0.354 -1.72 0.088 
 
ES53 Illes Balears -0.351 -1.70 0.091 
 
ITF2 Molise -0.344 -1.67 0.097 
 
Figure 13 shows the trend lines of the EQI for the country with the largest increase in 
within-country disparities from 2010 to 2017, Spain.  As the country average of Spain 
on the WGI has dropped six total places (from 13 to 19) from 2010 to 2017 within the 
EU28, this clearly has implication for the EQI scores of the Spanish regions in an EU 
comparative perspective, as regional scores are centered on national ones. While we 
observe significant and negative time trends in several regions as shown previously – 
Canarias, Galicia, Andalucía and Illes Balears for example – we see opposite trends in 
the regions in the north, such as Navarre, La Rioja, Pais Vasco and Cantabria.  While 
the individual regions at the top of Spain’s rank order did not show significant and 
positive changes in the full analysis, this divergence is clearly interesting and possibly 
worth deeper investigation.   
 
Figure 13: Regional Trends in the EQI in Spanish Regions 
 
 




10. Exploring potential case study regions 
Based on the analysis above, we provide a list of potentially interesting case study 
regions for further investigation.  For the purposes of possibly drawing out policy 
recommendations and ‘best practices’, we focus mainly on regions that have made 
notable positive changes.  We then perform a basic analysis showing changes in socio-
economic indicators over the time period for which we have EQI data to compare the 
QoG trends with trends in other data. 
In all, the data highlights many potentially interesting case studies, from many of the 
EU areas and in both older member states and newer ones. In the table below, 15 
possible regions are highlighted.  Most come from the new member states, such as the 
Czech Republic, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania, as these areas have made substantial 
increases in their overall score over time.  It is worth noting that several other Polish 
regions have also made significant positive increases, yet the two on the list below 
were the most apparent candidates. Moreover, the country of Lithuania is present, as 
it has made the most significant increase in governance scores of all member states 
during this time.  Yet two German regions – Bayern and Hessen –show significant 
improvements as well13.  In addition to the results of the significance tests, three 
Spanish regions are also of interest as they have trended upward away from the rest 
of their country’s regions in the data.  The French region of Bretagne is also included 
for consideration due to its consistent top ranking within the French regions as well as 
being in the top 15-20% of EU regions in each of the years. 
 
  
                                                 
13 
 The region of London also made significant improvements over time in several areas as well as the EQI 
on whole.  It was left of this list of possible case studies due to the unique status of London as a wealthy 

















      
  BG32 
Severen 
tsentralen 1.20 All 
no - 5 
provinces 
within region 
Second largest change 
in EQI over time. 




      
  CZ06 Jihovychod 0.62 
EQI, Imp, 
Corr 
no - 2 Kraj 
within region 
highest ranked region in 
NMS after EE and over 
EU average, steady 
improvement 
 
CZ01 Prague 0.85 
EQI, Qual, 
Corr yes 
highest ranked capital 
in NMS, increase in 
almost 1 s.d. in EQI 
data over time 
  CZ07 
Střední 
Morava 0.66 EQI, Imp 
no - 2 Kraj 
within region 
strong improvements, 
over EU mean in Imp 
Germany  
      
  DE2 Bayern 0.69 
EQI, Qual, 
Imp yes 
Highest ranked DE 
region, strong 
improvements each 
year. 2nd highest EU 
region in service quality 
 
DE7 Hessen 0.50 EQI yes 
steady increase each 
year in EQI 




FRHO Bretegne -0.19 none yes 
strong overall EQI 
performer, consistently 
highest in FR. drop in 
2017 due mainly to FR 
country drop 




LT Lithuania 0.73 
EQI, Qual, 
Corr yes 
country with most 
significant positive 
change over time 
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PL63 Pomorskie 0.76 
EQI, Qual, 
Imp yes 
highest ranked region in 
PL, steady improvement 
each round 
  PL22 Slaskie 0.64 
EQI, Corr, 
Imp yes   
Spain 
      
  ES22 Navarra 0.43 none yes 
change just under 90% 
level of confidence, 
steady increase in EQI 
despite strong ES 
average decline 
 
ES23 La Rioja 0.10 Qual yes 
sig increase in Qual, 
remains high EQI 
despite strong ES 
average decline 
  ES13 Cantabria 0.38 Imp yes 
steady increase in EQI 
despite strong ES 
average decline 
Romania 
      
  RO32 Bucharest 1.26 
EQI, Imp, 
Cor 
no - 2 
counties 
within region 
largest pos. change in 
EQI over timespan 
(although started in 







no - 7 
counties 
within region 
highest ranked RO 
region, increase of 0.75 
s.d. since 2013 
 
We then examine these regions’ trend lines on two variables taken from Eurostat for a 
relevant time period around EQI measurement – GDP per capita (PPP in in EU28 
average) and the unemployment rate. In addition, we show national trends in both 
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BG   
 
BG32   
   2007 38.6 7.2 
 
29 10.2 
   2008 41.3 5.9 
 
30 8.4 
   2009 41.7 7.0 
 
30 7.9 
   2010 40.9 10.5 
 
29 11.4 
   2011 41.4 11.6 
 
30 12.5 
   2012 42.7 12.6 
 
32 14 
   2013 42.4 13.3 
 
32 15.2 
   2014 43.2 11.8 
 
34 13.1 





                
 
FR   
 
FR52/FRH0   
   2007 91.6 9.4 
 
94 6.5 
   2008 89.8 9.0 
 
89 4.8 




2009 91.6 10.5 
 
90 5.3 
   2010 91.2 10.6 
 
89 6.5 
   2011 91.5 10.7 
 
90 6.8 
   2012 90.5 11.3 
 
89 7.7 
   2013 91.8 11.9 
 
90 7.6 
   2014 90.5 11.8 
 
88 7.1 





               
 
RO   
 
RO31   
 
RO32   















































             
 
LT   
      2007 60 4.2 
      2008 63 5.7 
      2009 56 13.7 
      2010 60 17.8 
      2011 65 15.4 
      2012 70 13.5 
      2013 73 11.9 
      2014 75 10.8 
      2015 
 
9.2 
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Below, we show visual trends of the EQI for the regions discussed (see previous figure 
for Spanish regions).  Regions are group based on the similar starting points of the 
EQI scores in 2010 for purposes of comparison.  
 
Figure 14: Trends in EQI among potential case study regions: Polish regions 
 
 
Here in Figure 14 we see a distinction between PL61 (Kujawsko-Pomorskie) which had 
one spike in the EQI from 2010 to 2013, yet a slight decrease from 2013-2017, and 
the other three regions, which show more steady increases.  The most consistent is 




















Figure 15 : Trends in EQI among potential case study regions: Czech regions 
and Lithuania 
 
As per Czech Republic and Lithuania most linear progression over time is that of CZ06 
(Jihovýchod), yet there is also consistent progress as well in the other two Czech 
regions.  Lithuania saw more of a mild increase between the first two years (from -
0.99 in 2010 to -0.81 in 2013), only to make a much larger one (-0.81 to -0.26) from 
















0=2010,  1=2013,  2=2017
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Figure 16: Trends in EQI: Romanian and Bulgarian Regions 
 
The starting point of the Bulgarian and Romanian regions is considerably lower than 
the other regions in this discussion, so room for marginal gains in the EQI over time is 
much greater.  Given this, it is clear the BG32 (Severen Tsentralen) , which made a 
total gain of roughly 1.2 standard deviations in the data over time has been most 
consistent – moving from -2.20 in 2010 to -1.67 in 2013, then to -0.99 in 2017.  
Bucarest (RO32) which saw the largest leap – about 1.3 standard deviations, mostly 


























Figure 17: Trends in EQI: Bayern and London 
 
Between the two regions that started above the EQI mean in 2010 – Bayern and 
London, we see clearly from the figure above that Bayern in Germany has made the 
steadiest gains in the data over time – from 0.64 in 2010, to 0.95 in 2013 to 1.38 in 
2017.  Whereas London, which has increased about 0.7 standard deviations, mostly 












0=2010,  1=2013,  2=2017
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PART II: Qualitative Report on Quality of 
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Coordinators: Nicholas Charron and Victor Lapuente 
 
Authors:  Paweł Chmieliński, Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics - National 
Research Institute, Poland. 
Barbara Wieliczko, Institute of Agricultural and Food Economics - National 
Research Institute, Poland. 




11. Introduction: country and case selection 
In this qualitative report, we conduct a research in two medium-large EU member 
states: Spain and Poland. One is an older member, the other a newer one. One is from 
the West, the other from the East. Within each country we have selected two regions: 
one that has experienced a notable improvement in (perceived) quality of government 
since the first EQI (2010) to the latest (2017), and one that acts as “control” because 
it does not seem to have experienced the same degree of upgrading. Pomorskie 
(PL63) and Navarra (ES22) fall within the former category, and Lubelskie (PL31) and 
Catalonia (ES51) within the latter. 






As we can see in Figure 18, both Pomorskie (PL63) and Navarra (ES22) started in 
2010 with a slight (in the Polish case) or remarkable (in the Spanish one) advantage 
over Lubelskie (PL31) and Catalonia (ES51) in terms of (again, perceived) levels of 
quality of government. Theoretically, and as we will see in the subsequent chapters on 
the Polish and Spanish regions, it could expected that Pomorskie could have a lead – 
in terms of good government – over Lubelskie, due to their different historical 
trajectories. Yet, as we can see in Figure 1.2, in the first place, that historical 
difference does not translate into a significantly better position for Pomorskie in the 
EQI 2010. The scores of Pomorskie and Lubelskie were virtually identical. What the 
evolution of the EQI indicator reveals is that, during the latest years, there seems to 
have been a divergent pattern in terms of levels of quality of government in the 
regions. At least, that is what the citizens in those regions perceive. And, as we will 
see in this report, this popular view by the citizens seems to fit quite well with the 
expert view by the key actors interviewed in these regions.  




In the second place, if historical differences mattered hugely, we would probably 
observe an advantage, in the Spanish case, of Catalonia, one of the, and definitely the 
iconic, industrial powerhouse of Spain since the 19th century. Yet, on the contrary, 
Navarra exhibits a significantly higher quality of government already in 2010 than 
Catalonia. And, if any, the evolution of the EQI indicates a growing gap between these 
two Spanish regions.  
As we have noted several times, the measurement of the EQI in a given region is 
based on the subjective views of their citizens in a given moment in time. And 
particular events may deteriorate those opinions. For instance, one argument used to 
criticize the poor performance of Catalonia in the 2010 EQI – when Catalonia was 
Spain’s worst performing region, and shocked numerous media and influential 
observers – was that, when the survey was conducted in December 2009, several 
high-profile corruption scandals in the region were unveiled. Consequently, these 
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notorious events could have led many Catalan respondents to underrate the quality of 
government in their region. Yet, almost a decade – and many corruption scandals 
uncovered all over Spain – afterwards, Catalonia still performs relatively poorly. In 
particular, the distance with high-performing Spanish regions, such as the Basque 
Country or Navarra, has not diminished, but, on the contrary, increased in recent 
years. The question is thus what explains those divergent paths within EU member 
states? 
An encompassing answer to that question is out of the scope of this report, but, in the 
following two chapters, we explore the differences between these higher- and poorer-
performing regions based on the views of experts active in these four regions. The 
methodology employed is interviews with public officials, and representatives of 
business, media and civil society in the regions. We asked about, first, their evaluation 
of the quality of government in the region. And, as we will see, they largely agree with 
the position their region gets in the EQI. Secondly, we questioned them on which are, 
according to their views, the reasons behind the high (or low) quality of government in 
the administrations operating in their region. As in the rest of the EQI study, it is 
important to remark here that we are not assessing the quality of the regional 
government, but the quality of the governments operating in the region, irrespective 
of whether they depend on national, regional or local authorities. We are concerned 
about what happens in the regions, not whose responsibility it is.  
 
12. Study of Lubelskie and Pomorskie regions in Poland 
By Paweł Chmieliński and Barbara Wieliczko 
1. Introduction  
Selection of regions and methodology  
The European Quality of Government Index (EQI), 2017 edition, developed by the 
Quality of Government Institute of Gothenburg University, shows that the Polish 
regions still lag behind most of the EU-15 counterparts. Yet, within Poland there are 
certain differences in the value of the EQI and its changes over time.  
Pomorskie region (PL63) was chosen for the case study as it was among the most 
dynamically and positively changing regions in Poland and Central and Eastern Europe. 
Total current rating of this region is 46.5 points, which translates into 109 places 
among 202 European regions. It  is one of the best result among the regions in 
Poland, especially compared to 2013, the position of the region clearly increased. 
Pomorskie has the highest EQI in Poland (tab. 18). 
Lubelskie region (PL31) was chosen for the case study due to the fact that its level of 
EQI did not change in the period 2013-2017. Its score is 35.7 and it ranks 147th 






Table 18. EQI2017 in Lubelskie and Pomorskie 
Specification Lubelskie Pomorskie 
Score Rank Score Rank 
Quality pillar 50.7 131 56.3 110 
Impartiality pillar 38.1 159 58.0 101 
Corruption pillar 38.0 140 41.7 126 
EQI2017 35.7 147 46.5 109 
Source: Own elaboration based on 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/maps/quality_of_governance#2  
 
The next two chapters of the report concern the two case study regions and they 
present the key characteristics of them. Chapter 2 is devoted to Lubelskie region, 
while chapter 3 to Pomorskie region. 
The finding of the survey conducted in Lubelskie and Pomorskie are analysed in 
chapter 4. The analysis of the factors contributing to the level of regional quality of 
governance presented in this chapter was conducted by looking at following 
dimensions of regional status quo:  
 Institutions: Politics & political parties. 
 Institutions: Public Administration. 
 Institutions: judiciary.  
 Media. 
 Civil society.  
 Impact of the EU. 
 
The report finishes with conclusions on the factors contributing to the observed 
differences in quality of governance in the two analysed Polish regions. 
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2. Description of Lubelskie region   
Polish regions in their current boarders and powers granted to regions were 
established in 1999 after the administrative reform which significantly changes the 
responsibilities and powers of non-central authorities. In the period 1975-1998 there 
were 49 regions (voivodships) in Poland. Since 1999 there have been only 16 of them. 
 
1. Historical background 
The history of the region as part of Poland started already in middle ages. Lublin, the 
region’s capital, was founded in 1317. It remained part of Poland until the 3rd  
partition of Poland in 1795 when it became part of Austria. 
The high degree of regional inequalities in Poland has its historical roots dating back to 
the 19th century. Poland was divided between Prussia, Austro-Hungary and Russia. 
Separate development conditions of these three territories have left deep traces that 
have manifested itself in the level of economic growth, infrastructure networks (roads, 
railways), the level of urbanization, the legal system, the level of education, the 
behaviour of the population and the cultural landscape. These differences were not 
offset by the Second Polish Republic, especially as the modernization efforts 
undertaken in the east were interrupted by the Second World War. 
With regard to agriculture and rural areas, the nature of regional diversity is also 
rooted in the agrarian changes taking place over almost 200 years of the turbulent 




of the process of transformation of agriculture from the feudal era and the capitalist 
economy changing the agrarian structure. These reforms took place during more than 
100-year period of partitions, where individual parts of the country were incorporated 
into various state organisms. The effect was that these reforms were carried out not 
only in three different periods of the nineteenth century (the appropriation took place 
over 50 years), but also took into account the differences in the law of the three 
invader countries. The conditions for running a farm in various parts of Poland were 
under the agricultural law of Prussia, Austria and Russia. Also, the development and 
character of agriculture in the areas of particular annexations was conditioned by the 
culture and the model of the agriculture prevailing in a given country. In the Prussian 
area, the appropriation was associated with concentration in agriculture, and thus with 
the creation of a smaller number of farms operating on large areas of land (over 67% 
of agricultural land was concentrated in farms with an area of over 20 ha). In the 
other regions the appropriation of land to peasants did not bring any changes in the 
agrarian structure, which was characterized by agrarian fragmentation and 
overpopulation. In the Austrian part of Poland the land use status characterized by a 
mosaic of small plots of land; while in the Russian part a polar structure began to 
form: on the one hand, small farms of appropriated peasants, and on the other, arable 
farms owned by the gentry. The policy of the invaders in the Polish lands, the manner 
and different dates of the enfranchisement reform carried out also affected agricultural 
culture and production efficiency in particular areas. In the Prussian partition, where 
the reform took place at the earliest, patterns of capitalism and agricultural culture 
characteristic of Western Europe were disseminated, while in the Russian partition, 
where the reform was carried out at the latest, the authorities sought to minimize land 
ownership by the privileged gentry14. 
Differences in the way the land reform was carried out in individual parts of Poland 
permanently set the limits for post-partition diversification of agriculture in Poland. 
The effects of it are visible not only in the modern agrarian structure, but also in the 
regional differences of the socio-economic level of development15. 
A significant impact on the scale of diversification in the socio-economic structure of 
rural areas in Poland was caused by changes in borders as a result of the Potsdam 
Conference of 1945. From the point of view of agricultural development, it should be 
emphasized that the amount of land used for agriculture in Poland decreased by 
15.5% ( up to 21,656 thousand ha), with up to a third of all agricultural land in the 
newly connected western and northern territories to Poland. With these changes, the 
post-war map of Europe involved a massive resettlement action of about 3 million 
Germans and about 1.5 million Poles from the territories of the then USSR. 
  
                                                 
14  B. M. Wawrzyniak: Przemiany struktury agrarnej w rolnictwie polskim (Transformation of the agrarian 
structure in Polish agriculture), WTN, Włocławek 2004, 25-27. 
15  See: E. Gorzelak, Sytuacja ekonomiczna gospodarstw rolnych w ujęciu przestrzennym przed i po 
zjednoczeniu Polski z Unią Europejską [The economic situation of farms before and after the unification 
of Poland with the European Union], In: Dostosowywanie polskiego rynku rolnego do wymogów Unii 
Europejskiej [Adjusting the Polish agricultural market to the requirements of the European Union], A. 
Kowalski (ed.), IAFE, Warsaw 2003, pp. 77-79. 
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Figure 22. Historical regions in Poland 
 
Source: Chmieliński (2006). 
 
After the Second World War, the state policy aimed at creating a centrally controlled 
economy resulted in the creation and promotion of the development of state-owned 
farms and agricultural production cooperatives. This is a subject that goes beyond the 
scope of this study, nevertheless to show the sources of spatial diversity of agriculture 
in the country, undoubtedly affecting the development of rural areas. 
Lubelskie was also active in the process leading to the system transformation in 
Poland. In July 1980 this were the factories in this region where the strike broke out 
and in August 1980 were followed up by workers in other regions. 
Due to historic developments and its peripheral position the region remains one of the 
poorest Polish regions. Today, it is classified by the Commission as a ‘lagging region’16 
  






2. Structural conditions 
Lubelskie is located in eastern part of Poland. Its eastern border is Poland’s state 
boarder. It boarders with Ukraine and Belarus – both non-EU countries.  
The current area of the region consists of the former Lublin, Chełm, Zamość, Biała 
Podlaska and (partially) Tarnobrzeg and Siedlce Voivodeships. 
The area of Lubelskie region is 25,122 km2 which amounts to 8% of Poland’s area, 
which gives it 3rd place in the ranking of regions based on their area. In 2016 the 
number of its inhabitants was 1.017 million. The density is much lower than the Polish 
average – 85 and 123 people per 1 km2, respectively. 
Lubelskie region’s share in the Polish GDP amounts to 3.8%. Service sector constitutes 
the most impoartant contributer to the region’s GDP. Agriculture’s share in the GDP 
amounts to 4.4%, while industries to 22.2% (fig. 23). 
Figure 23. Structure of the GDP in Lubelskie region  
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Lubelskie Voivodship 2017. 
 
The fact that the region lags behind most of other Polish regions is clearly visible in 
the GDP per capita. Despite the gradual increase in the GDP per capita in the period 
2010-2015, the region did not reduced the gap between its GDP per capita and the 
national average (tab. 19). 
Table 19. GDP per capita in current prices in Lubelskie region 
Region 
in EUR Poland = 100 
2010 2014 2015 2010 2014 2015 
Lubelskie 6,469 7,797 8,019 69.0 69.8 68.5 
Poland 9,381 11,172 11,698 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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The age structure of the region’s population is similar to the national average. During 
the recent decade it kept a slightly higher share of the population of less than 25 
years, which is related to a higher than the national average share of rural population 
characterised in the whole country by a higher share of young people. Yet, at the 
same time the region has a bit higher share of people over 65 years which can be 
attributed to outmigration of the people in the search for employment (fig. 24). 
Figure 24. Structure of the population in Lubelskie region, by age 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
The structure of the employment in Lubelskie region is not similar to the Polish 
average structure. The importance of the agricultural sector is the most vivid and 
distinctive characteristic of this region making it the most agricultural region. The 
share of agriculture amounts to over 37%, which is over twice the Polish average (tab. 
20). At the same time the share of industry in the employment is significantly lower 
than the country average amounting to only 17.5% while the national average is 
26.5%. 
Table 20. Structure of the employment in Lubelskie region and Poland (in 
2016) 
Sector Poland Lubelskie 
agriculture, forestry and fishing 16.0 37.2 
industry and construction 26.5 17.5 
trade 25.0 18.4 
financial & insurance and real estate services 3.8 2.5 
other services 28.7 24.4 
Trade also includes: repair of motor vehicles; transportation and storage; accommodation and 
catering; information and communication 















In the last decade the unemployment rate in the region showed a different trend than 
in Poland as a whole. In 2005, the unemployment rate in the region was lower than 
the national average which can be attributed to the importance of agriculture in 
employment and the related to it phenomenon of the hidden unemployment. Yet, the 
growth of the region’s economy did not keep pace with the national average and this 
is reflected in the higher unemployment rate as compared with the Polish average 
(tab. 21). 
 
Table 21. Unemployment rate in Lubelskie and Poland (in %) 
 Region 2005 2010 2015 2016 
Lubelskie 17.0 13.1 11.7 10.3 
Poland 19.2 12.3 8.9 7.1 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
Lubelskie region is characterised by a higher share of people under extreme poverty 
line which is set on the basis of the subsistence minimum estimated by the household 
expenditures. In the period 2005-2016 it fell by almost a half, but the drop in the 
share of people experiencing extreme poverty in Poland was even bigger thus 
increasing the gap between the Polish average and Lubelskie region (fig. 25). 
Figure 25. Share of population under extreme poverty line in Lubelskie 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
The development of the region can be expressed also by the changes in environmental 
protection. As an important indicator the share of people connected to wastewater 
treatment can be named. In the period 2005-2016 the share of population connected 
to wastewater treatment in Lubelskie region grew but the growth was much lower 
than in the Polish average. Moreover, it started from a significantly lower base. This 
means that Lubelskie still lags behind the rest of Poland when it comes to wastewater 
treatment. Yet, when we take into account only the urban population the share of 
people connected to wastewater treatment is almost the same as the national 
average. The problem is the share of connected rural population which is not much 
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Figure 26. Share of population connected to wastewater treatment (per cent 
of total population; urban & rural in 2016) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
3. Regional autonomy and funding  
The responsibilities of different administrative levels in Poland vary. Therefore, the 
scale of their revenue and expenditure, as well as their structure vary. Regions 
(voivodships) are divided into powiats and cities with powiat status, while there are 
divided into gminas. For an analysis of the scale of funds in the region it is worth 
comparing the per capita revenues and expenditure between the region and national 
average. 
Gminas in lubelskie have lower revenue per capita than the Polish average and the 
same applies to expenditure. This is a result of the economic situation of the region 
which is even more visible when we compare the share of own revenue in the total 
revenue. It is app. a quarter lower than the Polish average showing that the economic 
potential of the region lags behind the Polish average. 
The same applies to the next level of administrative system – powiats and cities with 
powiat status. Both revenue and expenditure at this level is lower in Lubelskie region 
than the Polish average. 
Only in the case of voivodship – the region the situation is different. The per capita 
revenue is by almost 9 p.p. higher than the Polish average. This is a result of the EU 
funds directed at the region. Lubelskie not only has its EU co-financed regional 
programme, but it also benefits from the Eastern Poland EU co-financed programme 
that is targeted at five Polish eastern regions that are characterised by much lower 



















Table 22. Revenue and expenditure per capita at different administrative 
levels in Lubelskie region 
Administration 











Revenue per capita in EUR 917 986 
Poland = 100 93.0 100.0 
total own revenue per capita in EUR 312 437 
of the total - own revenue in % of total 
revenue 34.0 44.3 
Expenditure in EUR 886 951 
Poland = 100 93.2 100.0 
Cities 
with powiat status 
  
  
Revenue in EUR 1,315 1,475 
Poland = 100 89.2 100.0 
Expenditure in EUR 1,311 1,426 





Revenue in EUR 225 232 
Poland = 100 97.1 100.0 
Expenditure in EUR 221 226 





Revenue in EUR 96 88 
Poland = 100 108.7 100 
Expenditure in EUR 86 82 
Poland = 100 104.8 100.0 
Expenditure in EUR: exchange rate: 1 EUR = 4 PLN 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
It is also worth to analyse the structure of funds at the gminas level. There are two 
key categories of these funds – own revenues and transfers from the state budget. 
Generally in Poland over 59% of funds in the gminas bugets are the money 
transferred from the state budget. In Lubelskie the own revenue amount to app. 31% 
of the gminas budgets which means that the share of own revenue is by almost a 
quarter lower than the Polish average. This is due to a much lower role played by the 
funds stemming from gminas’ share in the taxes collected in the region (tab. 23). 
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Table 23. Structure of gminas budgets in Lubelskie region and in Poland (%) 










CIT 0.47 0.84 
PIT 13.60 18.00 
tax on real estate 9.16 13.68 
agricultural tax 2.81 1.62 
tax on means of transport 0.64 0.79 
tax on civil law transactions 0.83 1.05 
stamp duty 0.16 0.18 
revenue from property 1.55 3.10 
revenue from services 1.54 1.64 
Targeted grants from the state budget 
for government administration tasks 29.83 25.88 
for own tasks 5.17 4.67 
General subvention from the state budget 
educational part 22.40 21.24 
remaining part 11.83 7.32 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
3. Description of Pomorskie region 
1. Historical background 
The region became part of Poland already in 960 during the reign of the Poland’s first 
historic ruler – Mieszko I. The beginning of the 14th century, the Brandenburg army 
took over the region. Polish king asked for help the Teutonic Knights for help. 
However, they took the land. The region was in the hands of the Teutonic Knights for 
many years. Strengthening their position and rule in the lands they gained, they built 
castles. The most magnificent was in Malbork. Until the mid-15th century, it served as 
the capital of the monastic state. 
After the Thirteen Years' War, which ended in 1466, the region returned to Poland. In 
the 16th and 17th centuries, Gdańsk became the most wealthy land of the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth. A center of culture, art and above all crafts. Gdańsk 
prevailed, endowed with many economic and self-government privileges. The city set 
trends in Polish trade and step by step it became a monopoly in this field. 
In 1772 there was the First Partition of Poland. Most of the region was taken by 
Prussia. In  the Second Partition of Poland (1793), among others Gdańsk and Toruń 
became part of Prussia. 
After the World War I Gdańsk became a Free City under the protectorate of the 
League of Nations. The Treaty of Versailles restored Poland to a part of the region with 
a small 72-kilometer access to the Baltic Sea. Poland, having no real access to the 
port in Gdańsk, built a new port in the neighboring Gdynia. 
After the World War II many of the Germans left the region, while numerous Poles 
from the regions which became part of the Soviet Union came to life in Pomorskie 
Region. 
During the socialist era in Poland (1945-1989) the region was an important industrial 
hub specialized in such branches of the industry as: electromachinery, energy, 
chemicals, furniture and food. The concentration of workers was partly responsible for 




took place. In December 1970 the government suddenly announced massive increases 
in the prices of basic foodstuffs. The public reacted with a protest. People gathered at 
rallies, demanding the authorities to withdraw the increase in prices, to regulate the 
pay system (in particular, the rules for calculating bonuses), and finally to remove the 
authorities responsible for the increase. The government used the army and other 
military forces to pacify the protesters. As a result there were many people injured 
and over 40 people killed – in Pomorskie region 24. 
In August 1980 the shipyard in Gdańsk played a key role in the strikes taking place in 
numerous Polish cities. The strikes, as in December 1970, were a response to the 
government’s authorization of the increase in food prices. This time the government 
did not use military force to pacify the protesters and The Gdańsk Agreement (or 
Gdańsk Social Accord(s) or August Agreement(s) was signed in the Gdańsk shipyard 
by the leader of the Solidarity movement, Lech Wałęsa. It was an accord reached as a 
direct result of the strikes.  
The Gdańsk shipyard is considered to be the cradle of the Solidarity movement. 
2. Structural conditions 
Pomorskie Region is located in north-western Poland at the Baltic sea. The provincial 
capital is Gdańsk. It includes former voivodeships of Gdańsk, Elbląg (partially), Słupsk 
(partially) and Bydgoszcz (partially). 
A province of rich cultural heritage. The Tricity urban area, consisting of Gdańsk, 
Gdynia and Sopot, is one of the main cultural, commercial and educational centres of 
Poland. Gdańsk and Gdynia are two of the major Polish seaports. 
Depending on the estimates, app. 500,000 people living in Pomorskie Region are the 
representatives of the ethnic group Kashubians. They speak the Kashubian language, 
which is classified either as a separate language closely related to Polish, or as a Polish 
dialect. Among larger cities, Gdynia has the largest proportion of people declaring 
Kashubian origin. Over 80% of the people in towns such as Linia, Sierakowice, 
Szemud, Kartuzy, Chmielno and Żukowo are of Kashubian descent. 
Pomorskie Region has an area of 18,310 km2, that is 5.9% of the whole area of 
Poland. This gives Pomorskie the 8th place in the ranking of regions. At the end of 
2016 it was inhabited by 2,315,600 people (6% of the Polish total population). Over 
64% of the region’s population lives in urban areas. Population density is slightly 
higher than for Poland – 126 persons/km2 (123 in Poland).  
The regions share in the Polish GDP is 5.8%. The region’s GDP structure shows that 
services constitute the most important part of the region’s economy (fig. 27). 
Agriculture is responsible for only 2% of the region’s GDP, while industry for 27%. 
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Figure 27. Structure of the GDP in Pomorskie region and Poland 
 
Trade also includes: repair of motor vehicles; transportation and storage; accommodation and 
catering; information and communication 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Pomorskie Voivodship 2017. 
 
GDP per capita in Pomorskie region in the period 2010-2015 was gradually growing, 
but it remained lower than the national average (tab. 24). 
 
Table 24. GDP per capita in current prices in Pomorskie region 
Region 
in EUR Poland = 100 
2010 2014 2015 2010 2014 2015 
Pomorskie 9,004 10,640 11,239 96.0 95.2 96.1 
Poland 9,381 11,172 11,698 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
The age structure of the population in the region is similar to the Polish average. Yet, 
the region has a slightly better structure of the population than the country as a 
whole, because the share of people over 65 is lower. However, in recent decade this 



















Figure 28. Structure of the population in Pomorskie region, by age 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
The structure of employment in the region differs from the Polish average. The most 
important difference is the much lower share of agriculture in total employment. It 
amounts to 8.1% which means that it is app. a half of the figure for Poland. At the 
same time the share of all the other sectors is in Pomorskie a bit higher than the 
national average (tab. 25). 
Table 25. Structure of the employment in Pomorskie region and Poland (in 
2016) 
Sector Poland Pomorskie 
agriculture, forestry and fishing 16.0 8.1 
industry and construction 26.5 29.0 
trade 25.0 27.8 
financial & insurance and real estate services 3.8 4.4 
other services 28.7 30.7 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
The unemployment rate in region used to be higher than the Polish average due to the 
closure of numerous factories. Yet, gradually, the region made bigger use of its 
development potential and currently, the unemployment rate is lower than the Polish 
average – 7.1% (8.2% in Poland) (tab. 26). 
Table 26. Unemployment rate in Pomorskie and Poland (in %) 
 Year 2005 2010 2015 2016 
Pomorskie 19.2 12.3 8.9 7.1 
Poland 17.6 12.4 9.7 8.2 
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In 2005 the share of people experiencing extreme poverty in Pomorskie region was 
higher than the average for Poland which is in line with the higher unemployment rate 
observed in the region at that time as compared with Poland as a whole. Yet, the 
reduction in unemployment rate was not fully followed by Pomorskie in the reduction 
of the share of people classified to the extreme poverty group. Yet, in 2016 the region 
finally managed to reduce its share of people under poverty line to the one lower than 
the Polish average (fig. 29). 
Figure 29. Share of population under extreme poverty line in Pomorskie 
region 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
The development of the region can be expressed also by the changes in environmental 
protection. As an important indicator the share of people connected to wastewater 
treatment can be named. The share of population connected to wastewater treatment 
in Pomorskie region was significantly higher than the national average all through the 
period 2005-2016. Yet, the difference between Pomorskie and the Polish average 
decreased showing that other regions made bigger progress than Pomorskie. Yet, it 
must be emphasized that the region is characterized by much higher than the national 
average share of rural population connected to wastewater treatment. This is 
important also due to the fact that costal part of the region is an important summer 

















Figure 30. Share of population connected to wastewater treatment (per cent 
of total population; urban & rural in 2016) 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
3. Regional autonomy and funding 
All Polish regions have the same status. Poland is a unitary state and the regions do 
not have much room for undertaking their own political agenda. Yet, the 
administrative reform implemented in 1999 gave them more power on managing their 
affairs and development. 
Administrative power in the Polish regions is exercised by both the regional self-
government and government and bodies of central government administration. The 
self-government operates on the basis of the Act of 5 June 1998 on the voivodship 
self-government. There is a regional assembly (Sejmik) elected in general and direct 
election for a period of time 4 years . The Marshal's Office, headed by a marshal 
elected by the regional assembly, serves as the regional executive branch of authority. 
The central authorities are represented by the regional office, headed by a voivode 
appointed by the prime minister who exercises supervision over the legality of 
operation voivodship self-government. 
The basic task and goal of the self-government is to define the voivodship 
development strategy and conduct the regional development policy. The local 
government cooperates in this area, among others with local self-government units 
(municipal offices, cities, starosts), voivode as a representative of state power, non-
governmental and voluntary organizations, universities and scientific and research 
units, other voivodships, as well as with organizations and regions of other countries. 
The assembly of Pomorskie region consists of 33 councilors. In Lubelskie there are 
also 33 councilors. The number of councilors depends on the number of inhabitants of 
the voivodship. In regions with a population of less than 2 million, there are 30 
councilors for each additional 500 thousand there are three more councilors. 
The key competences of the regional assembly include: 
 drafting local law, in particular: statute of the voivodship, principles of 
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 adopting the region’s development strategy and multi-annual regional 
programmes; 
 adopting a spatial development plan; 
 adopting a resolution regarding the mode of work on the draft budget 
resolution; 
 adopting a resolution regarding the detailed implementation of the region’s 
budget; 
 adopting the region’s budget; 
 defining the rules for granting subsidies from the region’s budget; 
 adopting regulations regarding taxes and local fees; 
 adopting resolutions on entrusting tasks of the voivodship self-government to 
other local government units; 
 adopting priorities of foreign cooperation of the region; 
 undertaking decisions concerning issuing bonds and taking long-term loans and 
credits as well as determining the maximum amount of short-term loans and 
credits taken by the voivodship board and the maximum amount of loans and 
guarantees granted by the voivodship board. 
 
The five-person board, headed by the region’s marshal, is the executive body. The 
Board also consists of one or two deputy speakers and three or two members of the 
board. All are elected by the regional councillors, but they do not have to belong to it - 
they may come from outside of the regional council. 
 
The responsibilities of different administrative levels in Poland vary. Therefore, the 
scale of their revenue and expenditure, as well as their structure vary. Regions 
(voivodships) are divided into powiats and cities with powiat status, while there are 
divided into gminas. For an analysis of the scale of funds in the region it is worth 
comparing the per capita revenues and expenditure between the region and national 
average. 
In the case of Pomorskie region the per capita revenue and expenditure of gminas is 
significantly higher than the Polish average, yet the share of own revenue in the total 
revenue was slightly lower than the country average. 
In the case of cities with powiat status the situation in Pomorskie region was almost 
the same as the Polish average, while in the case of powiats both the revenue and 
expenditure was substantially higher than the Polish average. At the voivodeship the 
level of revenue and expenditure was lower than the Polish average. This indicates a 
mixed financial situation of the region as a whole in comparison with the Polish 






Table 27. Revenue and expenditure at different administrative levels in 
region 
Administration 











per capita in EUR 1,092 986 
Poland = 100 110.8 100.0 
total own revenue per capita in EUR 456 437 
of the total - own revenue in % of total 
revenue 41.8 44.3 
Expenditure in EUR 1,052 951 
Poland = 100 110.6 100.0 
Cities 
with powiat status 
  
  
Revenue in EUR 1,476 1,475 
Poland = 100 100.1 100.0 
Expenditure in EUR 1,409 1,426 





Revenue in EUR 248 232 
Poland = 100 106.7 100.0 
Expenditure in EUR 244 226 





Revenue in EUR 79 88 
Poland = 100 89.8 100 
Expenditure in EUR 76 82 
Poland = 100 93.0 100.0 
Expenditure in EUR: exchange rate: 1 EUR = 4 PLN 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
It is also worth to analyse the structure of funds at the gminas level. There are two 
key categories of these funds – own revenues and transfers from the state budget. 
Generally in Poland over 59% of funds in the gminas bugets are the money 
transferred from the state budget. In Pomorskie the share of own revenue in the 
gminas budgets is 34%, which means it is by almost 7 p.p. lower than the Polish 
average. This is due to a much lower role played by the funds stemming from gminas’ 
share in the taxes collected in the region (tab. 28).  
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Table 28. Structure of gminas budgets in Lubelskie Pomorskie region and in 
Poland (%) 










CIT 0.47 0.60 0.84 
PIT 13.60 14.04 18.00 
tax on real estate 9.16 11.49 13.68 
agricultural tax 2.81 1.22 1.62 
tax on means of transport 0.64 0.69 0.79 
tax on civil law transactions 0.83 1.12 1.05 
stamp duty 0.16 0.16 0.18 
revenue from property 1.55 3.32 3.10 
revenue from services 1.54 1.35 1.64 
Targeted grants 
from the state 
budget 
for government 
administration tasks 29.83 25.24 25.88 
for own tasks 5.17 3.82 4.67 
General 
subvention 
from the state 
budget 
educational part 22.40 20.45 21.24 
remaining part 11.83 16.49 7.32 
Source: Own elaboration based on Statistical Yearbook of the Regions – Poland, 2017. 
 
4. Comparative analysis  
The study involved people involved in the socio-economic life of the regions: 
Pomorskie and Lubelskie. In individual regions, interviews covered respectively: 17 
people in Lubelskie and 18 in Pomorskie. The respondents were representatives of 
many professions: economist, brewer, marketing manager, communication officer, 
pensioner; founder of the NGO and chairman of the board, HR manager, culture 
animator, manager, entrepreneur, pensioner, consultant, beautician, lawyer, assistant 
to the director, marketer, engineer, sailor, public officer and others. The study was 
conducted in the period May-June 2018 using the direct interview method, 
supplemented with a questionnaire survey. 
This part presents a comparative analysis of the results of the questionnaire addressed 
to the participants of the socio-economic life of both selected regions. 
In Lubelskie, 10 out of 17 respondents strongly agreed with the relatively negative 
result of the assessment of their region in the QoG ranking in relation to the position 
of Poland and other regions, one person indicated that it partially agrees, and up to 5 
people could not formulate an opinion in this respect. 
In Pomorskie, as many as 15 out of 18 people agreed with the positive assessment of 
their region, one respondent pointed to the lack of sufficiently extensive analysis of 
factors affecting the situation in other regions of the country, and another 2 
respondents agreed with the need for further improvements and only one person 
could not formulate the opinion. Generally all respondents in Pomorskie confirmed the 
assessment of their region in QoG study. The approach to the state (government) 




roots in different influences of influence during (XVIII and XIX century) Poland’s 
partitions (the influence of the Russians in Lubelskie and German in Pomorskie) and 
the varying degree of influence of the Catholic church in particular, is of great 
importance in the perception of local and regional authorities (clearly greater influence 
of religion on social life in the Lubelskie region). 
1. Institutions 
It should be emphasised that in the Pomeranian region respondents relatively better 
perceive public institutions in the region both in terms of level of their impartiality, as 
well as effectiveness in providing public services. Also in the Pomorskie region, the 
situation regarding the level of corruption in public administration was definitely better 
assessed. 
Amongst the main reasons for the situation in Pomorskie region, good public 
management and close cooperation with stakeholders were highlighted. According to 
respondents HR issues were of great importance in good management. 
One of the interviewee expressed the opinion that:  
“Pomorskie is known for its very high assessment of its local governments - especially 
the so called Tricity (Gdansk, Sopot and Gdynia – agglomeration cities in the region) 
has been breaking records of support for its three presidents of cities  in local 
government elections. Presidents have been in office for several terms. Therefore, 
high region's ratings may result from high self-government work assessments.”  
One also emphasized well-functioning local government, economic and social 
traditions, relatively high economic resources, as well as transparency and level of 
social capital, as well as great involvement in civil affairs, which translates into a 
strong position of NGOs in the region. 
In turn, in the Lubelskie the position of the region in the ranking was motivated by a 
low level of social capital and economic conditions (low level of physical capital and 
underdeveloped infrastructure). As one of the respondents emphasized:  
“The weak influence of civil society, certain social behaviours that have been 
perpetuated over the years are not conducive to the development of civil society. The 
weak economic development of the region is also significant, which is related to the 
fact that the region's potential is not used, which causes the outflow of population to 
other, more developed regions, especially young people.” 
The low level of economic development is combined with a low level of human capital, 
especially outside larger cities, which intensifies a large outflow of inhabitants to other 
regions, especially young and well-educated people. In the Lubelskie region 
concentration of human capital is interrupted in the capital city of the region. This 
translates into the quality of power and legislation characterized by politicization and 
lack of transparency. 
As the respondent pointed out:  
“The entire bureaucracy process hinders the implementation of basic access to public 
goods. Maybe not well-trained team of people who have direct contact with customers 
and clients. Legislation also laps and often tries to explain procedures for the 
implementation of specific tasks in an intricate and complicated way. Work culture also 
often deviates from high quality customer service standards. If not to explain such a 
situation for a long time, it is still economic issues that dominate the situation the 
most.” 
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The above-mentioned characteristics of the relationship between the community and 
local centers of administration power translate into the level of trust in individual 
institutions of public life. Therefore, respondents in the Pomeranian region are more 
inclined to trust the police, local media or health service than in the case of the 
inhabitants of the Lublin region. 
In both cases, trust in political parties is very low, which has its reasons in the 
generally negative assessment of the level of political debate in Poland. 
It should also be emphasized that the general low level of public trust in the Lubelskie 
region translates into a more distrustful attitude to economic activity (business) in the 
region than in the case of respondents from the Pomeranian region. This has its 
impact on the way the administration cooperates with local entrepreneurs and 
translates into general conditions for running a business. 
2. Media 
Due to the growing general perception of the dependence and connections between 
the media and public administration in Poland, the respondents of both surveyed 
regions showed a general lack of trust in the media as an institution that stands for 
the proper implementation of the policy and respect to the law. While the level of 
confidence in public television was very low in both regions, the level of trust in the 
case of local public TV stations was slightly higher, as it was in the case of national 
private media. In general, the opinion was that the media had too large economic ties 
with representatives of the authorities, primarily through advertising and public 
administration, which are a significant position in the broadcasters' budgets, especially 
at the local level. It should be pointed out that the Pomorskie region is of the opinion 
that due to the relatively higher level of civic society, regional television remains 
under social (public) control (that is mainly reflected in the audience) to a higher 
degree than in the Lublin region, and "forces" a more objective approach to materials 
and topic coverage. 
In the case of radio and newspapers, the situation is similar, but the radio enjoys a 
relatively greater social trust than television. Interestingly, in Lubelskie definitely more 
people trusted the messages of national public radio than in the Pomeranian region, 
where in turn local radio stations had a relatively greater confidence. 
Also, internet sources had a low level of trust, which is connected with the fact that 
the sources of information for respondents were primarily online portals of nationwide 
and regional newspapers. 
The attitude to the media as a source of opinion and observatory medium of the 
actions of government is well characterized by a commentary on the results of the 
latest edition of the World Press Freedom 2018, where Poland was ranked at 58th 
position (among 180 countries) in terms of press freedom. 
Respondents from the Lublin region commenting on this result emphasized, among 
others, that there are no real restrictions on the press, however, the quality and 
ethical standards and much lower than one-two decades ago. While public media are 
largely dependent on politics (according to interviewee due to “targeting of 
advertisements and announcements from state and local government offices to 
selected media”, thus generating additional revenues to government-friendly entities), 
private media plan their information policies based on economic calculations, 
regardless of political sympathies, which is why they do not always have an interest in 
an objective approach to information, other respondents emphasize dependence of 
several media on foreign capital. 





“It is difficult for me to answer this question because I have no evidence to say that 
the regional press is biased. I do not try to read political information, I do not like 
exaggerated advertising, my luggage is not realized by politicians. For me, the 
information I can use directly in my favour is important. For example: what are the 
projects in the region, in which event I can participate, what investments are currently 
implemented or planned in the region, or interiors fragrances appreciating our region. 
(I appreciate) reportage with a local bakery or an ornithologist presenting birds of 
existence only in my region. As for residents in the press there is too much policy and 
so-called butter in butter (tautological statement). That's why it does not subscribe to 
logs.” 
Another person stressed that “The freedom of expression is already blocked all over 
the country. (This is a) preparation for censorship. Words are taken away from their 
original meaning. For example, substantive discussion means now nodding public 
authority. Our own opinion is a denial of today's understanding of the subject matter. 
It is common to take meaning away from words.” 
Also in the Pomorskie region political connections of media were called, as: 
politicization of journalists. In recent years in Poland, some representatives of the 
national media openly admit their political sympathies, which was reflected in the 
respondents' opinion sharing their motivation: “I think that there is no such idea as 
freedom of the press.”  
Respondent’s opinion: “The freedom of the press is influenced by large corporations or 
media entities that have appropriated the entire media space with their narrative. 
Thus, in the "market" way, they limit the possibility of breaking through to other 
heterogeneous and smaller media.” 
Respondent’s opinion: “Obstacles to freedom of the press, of course, exist, Some 
press titles are financed (and even issued) by affiliates of a political party / 
cooperating with a political party. Such a press is nothing but a propaganda tube.” 
An interesting picture of current situation is described in relation to the situation 
twenty years ago. In the Lublin region, the participants of the face-to-face interviews 
were divided in opinions, if now is better situation or worse, pointing to the 
development of technologies and related opportunities, while underlining the 
significantly lower level of journalism and the quality of information as compared to 
the situation two decades before. 
In another case, the relatively higher media's dependence on politics was stressed: 
Twenty years ago, the free press was just beginning to shape. It has come a long 
way. Total freedom, of course, never is achieved. Now there are restrictions and, 
above all, fear of the authorities' reaction. The media belong to the sphere of broadly 
understood culture, while this is the most delicate element and the most susceptible to 
the brutality of language and the primitivism of views. We already see the systematic 
replacement of experienced people with political statements. And there is no remedy 
for this. 
In the Pomorskie region it was emphasized that there is a greater choice of 
newspapers and magazines, but this does not necessarily translate into the freedom of 
their message. 
Similarly to the Lubelskie region, respondents pointed to the low morale of people 
working in the media, due to the excessive economic dependence of the press on 
public administration: 
“There is less freedom of the press in the sense that currently there are entire 
publishing houses that are on the services of the ruling party. Some of these 
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publications come from the Tricity - we know people who work there. So it's not like 
"bad private media make us water from the brain and slander state media", only we 
know people who work in the propaganda press and we know from the first mouth 
what's going on. Most people professionally practicing party propaganda do so only 
because they have to work somewhere.” 
To sum up, it should be emphasized that the study shows a clear relationship between 
the quality of social capital in a given region, as well as civil society on the quality of 
media functioning. The media control the actions of the authorities, while they count 
with the public opinion, which essentially affects the popularity and revenues from 
advertisements. 
5. Civil society  
When applying for positions in public administration and related units, respondents in 
both regions indicated the importance of political and personal connections in getting 
the job. In Lubelskie region, where 14 out of 17 interviewed person shared opinion on 
importance of personal connections, one of interviewees highlighted: 
“Unfortunately, mainly political and personal connections are decisive, it almost does 
not happen that these positions include people because of their skills and 
competences.” 
Another one stressed that: “They (key public officers) are only representatives of 
ruling parties or struggling for influence, even if they are not, to maintain their 
position they must be loyal to their superiors from the provincial or governmental 
administration.” 
This problem also appears in the Pomeranian region, although to a much lesser 
extent, where only 5 people out of 18 indicated that personal contacts and political 
connections are of great importance in obtaining work in the public sector, additionally 
there were definitely more indications that only competences or a mix of competences 
and connections: 
”This is not a problem, the level of qualifications is a problem - nowadays the 
management staff is more competent than it used to be in the past, although 
nepotism often occurs.” 
This situation changes with the change of approach at the national level - respondents 
indicate that in the face of the growing devaluation of the public administration at the 
national level, also at the regional level, this process is growing, as stated by the 
Pomeranian citizen: 
”It seems to me that in the public sector it is currently the case that a person with 
political connections gets a position, but probably so far the majority of positions are 
still with the people recruited years before, based on the competences.” 
Similarly, the answers regarding employment at lower levels of public administration 
are distributed - if this process in the Lubelskie region is largely related to the 
candidate's personal connections and current policy, in the Pomeranian region the 
recruitment process is based more on the assessment of competences then personal 
connections. Interestingly, in both cases, the majority of respondents indicate that the 
situation in their region does not differ significantly from the situation in other regions 
of the country. 
In turn, when asked whether officials would inform superiors about irregularities 
detected in their unit, in both cases the respondents were not able to express their 
opinion on this topic. Also in both cases, the majority of respondents indicated that 




goes hand in hand with the opinion that at the regional level there is no clear strategy 
in order to enforce compliance with the rules and employees of public institutions. In 
both regions, respondents basically were unable to point to anti-corruption 
regulations, in some cases they pointed to central regulations, work ethics or the 
institution of the Central Anticorruption Bureau (CAB, investigating body) operating at 
the national level.  
In the case of Lubelskie region, public opinion (citizens) are less often expressly 
related to media activity.  
In the Pomorski region, public opinion is much more likely to react to the case of 
corruption, pointing to numerous cases of social dissatisfaction with public-private 
scandals. There is a clear difference between the regions here, and the public opinion 
in the Pomeranian region responds very strongly to irregularities, although this is not 
always effective, in Lubelskie to a much lesser extent. “Citizens - if they are active - 
can enforce a lot of changes. The inhabitants of the Tricity are very active on the 
Internet.” or: “Public opinion often reacts but its reaction and outrage is not taken into 
account” (Pomorski region). 
In both cases, attention is paid to the importance of the media in tracking and 
publishing cases of irregularities. 
6. Impact of the EU 
In Pomorskie region relatively greater share of respondents expressed their opinion 
that they observe a significant change in the quality of public services since joining the 
EU, than in Lubelskie region.  
In both cases, there are reservations, although there is an opinion that the 
introduction of polic-making principles based on EU regulations has helped introduce 
higher standards in this area. In the Lubelskie region, the majority of respondents still 
think that there is a lot to do in this area, while in Pomerania there is a fear that 
changes at the central level will adversely affect the quality of public life in their 
region. In the Lubelskie region the EU membership, apart from the positive aspects, 
was strongly perceived as the reason of the increase of bureaucracy in administration. 
In the case of both regions, still almost half of interviewees maintained that wealthy 
people have a broader range of access to healthcare services (eg schools for children, 
preferences in access to healthcare, running a business). Social inequalities remain a 
major challenge at the local level, but with the development of civil society, these 
differences are decreasing. Only few respondents could recall loud issues related to 
irregularities in public administration. In the Pomeranian region, the respondent gave 
the following example: “The control of the Central Anticorruption Bureau at the 
Marshal's Office in Gdańsk (completed in March 2017) showed that the Pomeranian 
Voivodeship Board violated the Public Procurement Law in the submission of false 
declarations regarding impartiality by members of the Board when selecting the 
contractor. It is a Pomeranian Development Agency SA, a public institution whose 
100-percent shareholder is Pomorskie Voivodeship. ARP SA was selected in a 
competitive mode, in accordance with the PPL act as a service provider within the 
Pomeranian Smart-Up project evaluated the offers, only formally approved the 
outcome of the work of the tender committee, and it should be noted that the 
members of the Pomorskie Voivodship Board act within a collegial body, rather than 
individually, it is difficult to recognize that members of the Voivodship Board could 
obtain any benefit by selecting a public institution. On the one hand, members of the 
Management Board who signed a declaration of impartiality in connection with the 
approval of the tender were accused of doing so, and on the other hand a member of 
the Management Board absent at the meeting because of the delegation was accused 
of not having signed the statement. Office, comments on public procurement have no 
legal and factual basis - they result from the erroneous interpretation of the law by the 
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CAB and in the incorrect analysis and synthesis of the collected evidence. I think the 
likelihood of this situation reoccurring is small.” 
W Lubelskie region responded gave an following example: 
“The court in Suwałki impartially handed down the verdict acquitting people who 
opposed the campaign of Mr. Anders in the museum. Now the authorities muttered 
and probably some judge would abolish this verdict. This is just a loud example.”  
Summing up, in Poland accession to the EU introduced the framework of policy 
making, and the regulations regarding spending public funds, supported from the EU 
budget, introduced new rules for qualification and distribution of public support, which 
generally had a positive effect on the quality of the administration, however in 
different regions it took place to varying degrees. In the Pomeranian region to a 
greater extent the principles of transparency were enforced by the media and society, 
in Lubelskie, due to the lower civic engagement, this situation was relatively worse. 
 
Conclusions 
Polish regions are still characterised by a low level of EQI as compared with most of 
the EU-15 regions, excluding the many regions of Spain, Italy and Greece. The low 
level of EQI is in Poland accompanies by much lower level of GDP per capita. 
The level of EQI in both of the Polish regions analysed seems to reflect both the 
current economic situation of these regions as well as their historical and cultural 
backgrounds. Different development pathways these regions went through during the 
Polish partition period left a still visible mark on the current quality of governance. 
These differences still have an influence on the way the culture, including functioning 
of regional administration and relations between different institutions and citizens. 
This is reflected in the conducted study, which showed a relatively lower effectiveness 
and quality of public institutions' functioning, which is reflected in the social 
characteristics and civic participation of residents. In the Pomorskie region, where 
historically social values were based on Western culture (associated with Protestant 
roots and ties with Western countries), the culture of public administration is greater - 
to a large extent it is dictated by a higher level of social capital and civil society, which 
affects the level of media objectivity and greater social control over local authority. 
In the subject literature in Poland, differences in mentality, socio-economic 
development in particular regions of the country are widely commented, which has its 
causes due to different historical conditions (especially those related to the impact of 
eastern and western culture). These divisions are evident, for example, during the 
parliamentary elections, also in this study. With outlined differences in the perception 
of various aspects of regional socio-political life, membership in the EU had an 
unambiguously positive effect on the level of law-making, and currently the level of 







13. Study of Navarre and Catalonia regions in Spain 
1. Introduction 
1. Regional QoG performance in the country 
Spain is a paradigmatic example of the complexity and very diverse levels of quality of 
government (QoG) that can be found within the same country, to the point that the 
actual performance of the Spanish state cannot be properly captured by exclusively 
looking at the central government. On the contrary, the existence of significant 
interregional differences recommends gathering information at sub-state level, so to 
provide a more accurate picture of QoG within the country. 
All throughout the period covered by the investigation on regional QoG (2009-2017), 
Spain has obtained nation-wide EQI scores close to the EU average. But this apparent 
stability conceals a decline in Spanish QoG, especially when compared to other 
countries. In the first round of the analysis, Spain was ranked 15th out of the 27 EU 
member states and clustered together with France, Belgium, Malta, Portugal, Cyprus, 
Estonia and Slovenia. When the study was replicated four years later, Spain climbed 
up to the 14th spot, thus experiencing a slight improvement (See Charron, Lapuente 
and Rothstein 2018: table 1); but it then had a great fall, down to the 19th position in 
the last round (See Charron and Lapuente 2018: table 2A). As a result, Spain now 
looks less like some Western -or even Southern- European countries with which it was 
initially grouped, and it is currently much closer to new EU member states from 
Eastern and Central Europe, such as Lithuania, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Poland 
and Latvia.  
Most importantly for the purposes of this qualitative analysis, great spatial and 
temporal differences can be found between Spanish regions17, while the gap across 
them has broadened over time, too. Let’s see these differences in further details:  
 First of all, Spain is the only country that includes regions both, above the 
mean EQI score at EU level -such as Cantabria, the Basque Country and 
Navarre- and below it -such as Madrid, Galicia, Andalusia and the Canary 
Islands; while the number of regions with EQI scores below the European mean 
has risen from four in 2010, to six in 2013 and to ten in 2017. ACs with EQI 
scores under the EU average are rather spread throughout the territory of the 
country, whereas most regions performing over the EU average are in the 
North of the country18. This suggests some connection between territorial 
location and quality of government19. 
  
                                                 
17  In the Spanish context, the terms ”region” and ”autonomous community (AC)” are often used 
interchangeably. Both of them refer to the intermediate territorial level between the centra state and the 
local entities; yet, the first one constitutes mainly a geographical concept, whereas the second one 
highlights the political-institutional dimension and is the legal form the Spanish regions adopted as a 
result of assuming the autonomy granted by the 1978 Spanish constitution. 
18  Extremadura seemed to be the only exception in 2017.  
19  As a matter of fact, some sort of territorial pattern has become apparent over time, because the number of 
Northern regions with poor EQI results and Southern regions with good ones is smaller in 2017 than it 
was in 2013 and 2010.  




 Second of all, Spain is, after Italy, the country with the widest divergence of 
QoG at sub-national level; and this divergence has grown over time. In 2010, 
more than twenty-four points set the Basque Country (the best performing 
region at the time, with an EQI100 score of 76.63) apart from Catalonia (the 
worst performing region, with an EQI100 score of 52.07). The gap between the 
regions respectively at the top and at the bottom of the ranking narrowed 
down to eighteen points in 2013; only to broaden once again in 2017. As a 
result, there is nowadays a thirty points-gap between the AC with the highest 
score -the Basque Country (63.3)- and the AC with the lowest one -Andalusia 
(33.2).  
 Third of all, Spanish regions vary greatly in their evolution over time. In line 
with a common trend within Southern Europe, most ACs have experienced a 
deterioration in their quality of government in recent years: Twelve of them 
showed worse EQI scores in 2017 than they did in 2010; besides, in some 
particular cases -such as Galicia, Castile La Mancha, Valencia or the Balearic 
Island- this decline have entailed a jump from a position above the European 
average to a position below it. On the other hand, the Basque Country, 
Cantabria, La Rioja and Navarre, all regions in Northern Spain, have 
experienced the opposite development: they had scores over the EU average 
already in 2010 and have improved since then.  
 
2. Selection of regions and methodology 
As it has just been pointed out, Spain features one the greatest levels of inter-regional 
variation in quality of government. Taking this into consideration, the main selection 
criterion for this qualitative report was choosing one ‘high QoG’ region -Navarre 
(ES22)- and another ‘low QoG’ region -Catalonia (ES51).  
Since the first Quality of Government Index (QoG Index) was published, Navarre has 
consistently registered values above the Spanish and European averages; and it has 
also experienced a steady progress, relative to the rest of Spanish ACs. More 
specifically, Navarre has gone from the 10th position in 2010, to the 6th and 2nd 
positions respectively in 2013 and 2017.  And it is currently among the top 35% 
European regions, with similar scores to, for example, Saxony-Anhalt (Germany) or 
Ile-de-France (France).  
Catalonia’s performance in governance (at least as citizens perceive it) is quite 
different to Navarre’s.  In 2010, Catalonia received the worst result of all Spanish 
regions and was also below the European average. After some improvement in 2013, 
Catalonia’s position deteriorated once again in 2017, when it fell down to the 12th 
position within Spain. Consequently, it remains in the middle-low zone of European 
regions, with similar scores to Moravskoslezsko or Jihozapad (Czech Republic) and 





Table 29. EQI2017 in Catalonia and Navarre 
Specification Catalonia Navarre 
Score Rank Score Rank 
Quality pillar 53.5 120 72.5 56 
Impartiality pillar 47.1 129 65.9 75 
Corruption pillar 40.2 133 55.1 89 
EQI2017 40.8 127 60.3 73 
Source: Own elaboration based on   
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/information/maps/quality_of_governance#2 
 
Ultimately, it can be said that citizens in Navarre are largely satisfied with their public 
sector and they believe that public administration in their territory works in a more 
impartial, more effective and less corrupt way than most ACs. Conversely, citizens in 
Catalonia consider that Catalan institutions have performed in all three dimensions 
assessed in the QoG Index far less satisfactorily20.   
These differences between Catalonia and Navarre become particularly striking if we 
take into consideration that both are Northern and economically better-off regions 
within Spain.  
As for methodology, this work is based on information collected through a series of 
personal interviews with experts in different academic and professional fields 
conducted during the month of April 2018; this was complemented with official data 
and other secondary sources. The remaining of the chapter is structured as follows: 
sections two and three deal with one region each and pay attention to their key 
historical, institutional and socio-structural features. Section four focuses on aspects 
such as political parties, civil service or the media, in an attempt to provide a 
provisional explanation of Catalonia’s and Navarre’s divergent results in quality of 
government. Section five offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Catalonia 
1. Structural conditions (geographical & economic features) 
Catalonia is Spain’s most North-eastern region. It is bordered by France and Andorra 
to the north, the Mediterranean Sea to the east, the AC of Valencia to the south, and 
the AC of Aragon to the west. Its surface is just over thirty-two thousand square 
metres, thus amounting to about six percent of the Spanish territory.  The Catalan 
population reached seven and a half million inhabitants in 2017, which represents over 
sixteen per cent of the Spanish population. This makes of Catalonia the second biggest 
AC in population size, after Andalusia.  
                                                 
20  The only similarity seems to be that both regions perform better in the quality pillar followed, in this 
order, by the dimensions of impartiality in the provision of public services and control of corruption (See 
Table 1).   
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As for the economy, Catalonia slightly reduced its weight within the national economy 
during the crisis; but it has more recently reached its historical peaks. As a result, it 
currently constitutes the largest regional economy in the country, with a share around 
nineteen percent of the Spanish economy (see table 30).  
Table 30. Size of regional economy, Catalonia 
 




Catalonia is also one of the most highly industrialised parts of the country, where the 
industrial sector contributes around four percentage points more than it does in the 
country as a whole. It has traditionally featured a strong textile industry. Since the 
process of diversification set off in the 1950s, however, metalworking, food-
processing, pharmaceutical, and chemical industries have gained more prominence; 
furthermore, services (particularly those related to tourism and transportation) are 
highly developed, too. Additional data illustrate Catalonia’s weight in the Spanish 
economy: according to the National Institute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística-INE), in 2016 Catalan exports accounted for 25.6 percent of all Spanish 
exports; its industries represented 22.7 percent of the Spanish industrial sector; and 
the region received over 24 percent of foreign tourists who visited Spain.  
 
Figure 31: GDP sectoral structure in Catalonia, 2015 
  
Source: Own elaboration with data from INE.  
 
 GDP per capita GDP (% of country) 
 2010 2013 2016* 
2010 2013 2016* 
 Euros % Euros % Euros % 
Catalonia 27.192 117,1 25.945 117,9 28.845 119,8 18,8 18,8 19,1 





Catalonia is also a wealthy region, with a GDP per capita well above the Spanish 
average (see table 2); in fact, it has consistently ranked among the four best ACs in 
the country. Catalonia has also performed well in employment, with unemployment 
rates between three and four percentage points lower than the Spanish average, 
which have also experienced a positive evolution from 19 percent in 2015 to about 
12.6 percent in late 2017. Since employment and GDP per capita stand as good 
indicators of quality of life, then Catalan inhabitants are among the Spaniards who 
enjoy the best living standards. 
3. Navarre 
1. Structural conditions (geographical & economic features) 
Navarre is located in the North of Spain, in the western end of the Pyrenees. It is 
bordered by France to the North, the Basque Country to the West, the ACs of La Rioja 
to the Southwest and the ACs of Aragon to the South and East. With an area of just 
under ten and a half thousand square metres, it is the fourth smallest region in the 
country. The Navarrese population was about six hundred forty thousand inhabitants 
in 2017, which represents under one and a half per cent of the Spanish population. 
This makes of Navarre the fourth smallest AC in population size.    
As for the size of the Navarrese economy, it contributes 1,7 percent of the Spanish 
GDP; this percentage has remained rather constant over time and it constitutes a 
slightly larger contribution by the region to the Spanish economy than its share in the 
Spanish population (see table 31). 
Table 31. Regional economy, Navarre 
 




Navarre’s agricultural output has been kept relatively; yet, above the Spanish 
average. Apart from that, the regional economy is clearly oriented towards industry 
and exports. In fact, the industrial sector represents about a third of the regional GDP, 
well above the national average, and with a specific weight of the car industry and 
auxiliary sectors, as well as machinery, house appliances, processed foods and 
beverages, and paper. Moreover, exports constitute over 40 percent of the regional 
GDP, which almost doubles the weight of imports into the region.  Services are also 
important and concentrated in Pamplona, which is the commercial centre of Navarra.  
  
 GDP per capita GDP (% of country) 
 2010 2013 2016* 
2010 2013 2016* 
 Euros % Euros % Euros % 
Navarre 28.752 123,9 27.442 124,7 29.859 124,0 1,7 1,7 1,7 
Spain 23.215 100,0 22.014 100,0 24.085 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
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Figure 32: GDP sectoral structure in Navarre, 2015 
  
Source: Own elaboration with data from INE. 
 
According to INE, Navarre had the lowest regional unemployment rate in 2017, with 
9.6 percent; that is, 6 percentage points lower than the national average of 16.6 
percent. As for GDP per capita, it occupies the 3rd place in the ranking of ACs. It also 
enjoys one of the lowest regional public debts. All these figures show that Navarrese 
are among the Spaniards with the best living standards within the country. 
4. Comparative analysis 
This section offers an analysis of nineteen in-depth personal interviews conducted 
either face to face or over the phone, during the month of April 2018. Twelve 
interviewees came from Catalonia and the remaining seven were from Navarre21. As 
many as fourteen interviewees had public responsibilities as politicians, civil servants 
or employees either at the regional level or in various Catalan and Navarrese 
municipalities; three interviews were addressed to scholars in government and public 
administration or in the legal field; and two more interviewees came from the private 
sector (see Annex for the professional profile of interviewees).  
As it will be shown next, the results suggest that the variation between Catalonia’s 
and Navarre’s performance in quality of government may have to do both with 
structural conditions, and political-institutional and/or administrative choices.  
1. Expert assessment on the regions’ ranking and their evolution over 
time 
Experts were split in their evaluations of Catalonia. In fact, the only clear agreement 
among them was about the distorting effects that the territorial conflict and the social 
division over the issue of independence was likely to have both on the citizens’ 
perceptions and on their own views.  
                                                 
21  The difference in the number of interviews carried out in each region was largely junctural, since it was 




Some of them expressed a very critical position, thus in line with the results of the 
citizens’ survey. According to interview 10, for example, Catalonia has for long 
benefited from its “apparent modernity” and, for a while, it even served as an example 
to other administrations. However, “issues related to institutional quality and 
institutional organization have never been high in the agenda of the regional 
government”; so that, after the surface is scrubbed out, internal contradictions and a 
rather mediocre situation are revealed. 
On the other side, most interviewees shared the view that Catalonia might be lagging 
behind the smaller regions in the North of Spain (particularly the Basque Country and 
Navarre), but it was still performing better than most of the remaining ACs. They, 
thus, found it difficult to understand Catalonia’s EQI scores -that set their region apart 
from a Northern pattern- and the reasons why Catalan citizens have consistently 
ranked it so low over time. For some experts within this group, the way citizens 
perceive the functioning of public administration and the quality of services in 
Catalonia might have experienced a reversal especially due to major cases of 
corruption, that are somehow associated to problems of impartiality, too. But, it was 
further argued that these corruption cases recently known and/or judicialized are in 
fact old ones, go many years back and do not necessarily reflect the current situation; 
whereas a deeper inquiry suggests the existence of a great difference between 
“perceiving” corruption and “experiencing” it (Interview 4)22. Moreover, the 
Generalitat of Catalonia is deploying efforts in implementing and developing 
transparency measures at the present time, that seem to have less influence on 
citizens’ perceptions (Interviews 4 and 7).  
In contrast to Catalonia, the experts’ assessment was more homogeneous concerning 
Navarre. Interviewees broadly agreed with the results of the citizens’ survey, that 
places their region at the top of the ranking of ACs and well above the European 
average scores in all three dimensions under examination. Most of them were also 
proud to highlighting that Navarre’s good governance has remained quite stable over 
time, to the point that the economic crisis seemed to have affected the region only 
very slightly (see specially Interviews 9 and 17).  
As a matter of fact, the people interviewed shared the view that public services are 
provided with high efficiency in Navarre; they considered their regional government to 
be more efficient than the central one; and that corruption was mainly a problem 
associated to the central government or to other regions23. If anything, some of them 
warned that the change in government brought about by the regional elections held in 
2015 might affect impartiality in the process of decision-making, although the brief 
period elapsed since then could explain that it was not reflected in the citizens’ survey 
yet.  
  
                                                 
22  According to the barometer conducted by the Catalan Antifraud Office in 2018, over 70 percent of 
Catalans perceive that there is much corruption and it is a very serious problem, but less than 30 percent 
of them affirm to have witnessed actual cases of corruption, pity corruption or inappropriate conducts. 
See “La corrupción en Cataluña: percepciones y actitudes Ciudadanas” (available at: 
https://www.antifrau.cat/es/barometro-2018.html).   
23  As one expert pointed out, the only single conviction for corruption dates back to the late 1980s 
(Interview 5). This idea has been reinforced in the media where many pieces of news can be lately found 
stressing that Navarra is the only AC under no investigation for suspected political or administrative 
corruption (See, for example, Elia, N. “La burbuja de la corrupción pincha en Navarra”, eldiario.es, June 
17th, 2017 (https://www.eldiario.es/norte/navarra/burbuja-corrupcion-pincha-
Navarra_0_655484787.html)).  
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2. Contributing factors of the regional QoG 
The main factors identified that seem to be contributing to the variation in regional 
QoG can be organised in four main categories: (1) socio-structural factors, including 
aspects of the civil society, public opinion and political culture; (2) factors related to 
the institutional setting, including the employment and hiring practices in the public 
sector; (3) factors related to the political parties’ ideologies and dynamics; and (4) the 
role played by the media.   
a. Socio-structural factors 
Interviewees from Navarre were quick and unanimous to suggest that the small size of 
the region and its municipalities24 has a positive impact upon the quality of 
government, through a series of direct and undirect mechanisms, that one interviewee 
referred to as “informal anti-corruption controls” (Interview 16): First of all, the very 
size of the region leads to a public administration of equally small size that leaves little 
room for discretional appointments. As one interviewee illustrated it, whereas in many 
ACs there used to be five or six discretional appointees between the regional ministry 
and the general director, in most departments in Navarre there were none (Interview 
11).  Second of all, the closeness and proximity between citizens and administrators 
enables the former to more easily watch over the later what, in turn, “makes it hard, if 
not impossible, to take decisions according to ideological, political or personal 
interests” (Interview 17).  
Finally, its small size has also facilitated the knowledge and spreading of good 
practices, a healthy competition and processes of imitation not only among public 
institutions but also between the public and private sectors. In two key policy fields 
such as health and education, for example, there are renowned private institutions 
that constitute a “close reference” and even a “challenge” for the public institutions to 
become more self-demanding and to aspire to similar performance levels (Interview 
11).  
Importantly, however, this provisional relationship between size and QoG can only be 
established in the case of small regions, whereas no disadvantage can be necessarily 
derived from being a large region; and no interviewee from Catalonia has suggested 
that any consequence could be derived from this very feature.  
As for the role of the citizenship, there was a broad agreement both in Catalonia and 
Navarre about the (theoretical) importance of having an active and assertive civil 
society that may serve as an appropriate context and fertile ground for the 
development of a more transparent public action and a higher quality public 
administration. In fact, Navarrese society was described as being very demanding, to 
the point that “citizens were used to watch over even minor issues like the way of 
tiling the pavement, so that public institutions couldn’t afford to do things wrongly” 
(Interview 11). Ideally, then, “the society should always act as the first sword and the 
politician as a pawn” (Interview 18). However, doubts were also raised on the type of 
civil society that exists in Catalonia and Navarre and/or their actual impact on public 
management. 
On the one hand, both ACs feature a powerful and dynamic “social fabric”, with many 
associations that are very involved in social and cultural issues. And these associations 
have a decisive influence over public policies in their respective fields, particularly at 
                                                 
24  According to the official data for 2017, Navarre has just under six hundred and fifty thousand 
inhabitants, which represents less than 1,5 percent of the whole Spanish population. Most importantly, 
almost half the Navarrese population lives in municipalities smaller than 2000 inhabitants whereas, on 
the other side, only twelve percent of the people live in municipalities larger than 20000 inhabitants 




local level (Interviews 1, 2, 6, 12 and 18). Moreover, organisations of the civil society 
defending transparency and open data have proliferated in Spain over the last years, 
such as ‘Civio’, ‘Access Info Europe’, ‘Qué hacen los diputados’ or ‘Openkratio’ that, 
autonomously or in coordination, have demanded the adoption of transparency laws in 
line with international standards (Magallón et al., 2017: 62-63).  This recent culture of 
open data has pushed for the creation of open data projects at various territorial 
levels, as it has happened in Catalonia and Navarre (Interviews 5 and 15).  
Beyond this, most associations are not primarily oriented towards good public 
management or they are highly dependent on public funding; and both factors seem 
to have ultimately limited the capacity of organisations of the civil society to watch 
over political parties, individual politicians and the functioning of public 
administrations. In the case of Catalonia, for instance, having a small public 
administration has led to an increase of concerted policies. And these have opened an 
arena of confluence between the private and public spheres, where counterproductive 
exchanges or even corruption are more likely to occur. According to one interviewee, 
Catalan civil society “has not contributed to cut corruption down; on the contrary, it 
has got used to coexist with institutionalized corruption” (Interview 13).  
In both ACs, moreover, citizens and civil organizations are spilt over the issues of 
nationalism and territorial identity and, somehow, they are ideologically-biased when 
performing their overseeing role. Specifically, they are more willing to voice criticisms 
against opposition parties and more willing to tolerate kindred ones (Interviews 12, 13 
and 18).  
b. Institutional setting 
To start with, many interviews mentioned one element of the general institutional 
framework of the State of Autonomies. The financing system established for the 
Spanish ACs results in a clear asymmetry between Catalonia and Navarre, that some 
Catalan interviewees and all Navarrese ones has argued to wield a non-negligible 
influence on their performance in terms of quality of government. The common 
financial system that applies to most ACs, in practice leaves Catalonia with fewer 
resources that it would enjoy under a model with greater fiscal autonomy. This 
imposes budgetary constraints upon the Catalan Generalitat that are likely to affect 
public services there (Interviews 6 and 7).  
By contrast, its own “Foral system” allows Navarre to levy all the taxes in its territory 
and to pay a compensation to the central government later, in order to finance the 
expenses this had incurred in the Navarrese region. Navarre’s financial regime, 
coupled with the fact of being one of the wealthiest ACs, translates into more 
economic resources what, in turn, contributes to the provision of high-quality public 
services. As one expert from Navarre pointed out, “we tend to consider ourselves to 
be better; but, of course, it is difficult to do with 3000 euros per student the same as 
one does having 6000” (Interview 11; see also interview 9). 
More importantly, although at first glance the abundance of resources might create no 
pressure for the regional administration to work creatively and in an efficient manner, 
the greater fiscal responsibility derived from the Navarrese fiscal autonomy does. In 
fact, fiscal responsibility seems to matter more than wealth because it develops and 
strengthens a larger sense of ownership both among citizens and within the public 
administration:  On the one hand, Navarrese people are more willing to contribute to 
the regional treasury -which they consider to be their own and to which they feel 
somehow emotionally linked- than they would if taxes were levied by the central 
government (Interview 16). On the other hand, since the Navarrese government has 
almost no economic reliance on the central government, it becomes more conscious 
and stricter about its taxation system and how its revenues are spent (Interview 16).  
Measuring the quality of Government at the subnational level and comparing results with previous studies 
93 
 
Apart from this, the experts intervieweed largely shared the opinion that good 
governance is inevitably linked to the principles of transparency, accountability, 
participation or integrity. Yet, they immediately conceded that Spain lacks a long 
public culture of transparency and integrity. In fact, the first Spanish Law on 
Transparency only goes back to 201325, and it was preceded -and in some cases also 
improved and surpassed in its contents- by the regulations at regional level. These are 
particularly the cases of Catalonia and Navarre, that passed their own laws on this 
matter respectively in 201426 and 201127.  
In both ACs, the monitoring role over the working of public institutions have 
traditionally been carried out by general bodies such as comptrollers, public 
prosecutors, regional Courts of Audit and regional Ombudsmen, as it was pointed out 
by many interviewees (Interviews 3, 15 and 16). Furthermore, based on their 
respective regulatory frameworks, each region has created (or is currently preparing) 
specific bodies and instruments for the management and control of transparency, 
participation and good governance; among them, there are ethical codes for civil 
servants and senior officials28, regional and local registries of activities and interests29 
and transparency portals at regional and local levels30. Finally, Catalonia and Navarre 
have also established an institution specifically devoted to the prevention and control 
of corruption and any other fraudulent practices, namely, the regional anticorruption 
office31. As it will be shown next, the assessment of all these instruments appears to 
be far from unanimous.  
Experts from Navarre demonstrated little knowledge of the existence of the various 
mechanisms dedicated to controlling corruption and some of them even doubted about 
their necessity. According to interviewee 11, “Navarre works very well, regardless of 
                                                 
25  See the Spanish Act 19/2013, of December 9th, on Transparency, Access to Public Information, and 
Good Governance (available at: http://transparencia.gob.es/transparencia/dam/jcr:2fcd5d26-cf51-4775-
8d44-6683586f1ee9/ley-de-transparencia-ingles.pdf). 
26  See the Catalan Act 19/2014, of December 29th, on Transparency, Access to Public Information and 
Good Governance (available at: https://www.boe.es/boe/dias/2015/01/21/pdfs/BOE-A-2015-470.pdf). 
27  Navarre was one of the first ACs to legally address this issue, and it approved its Foral Act 2/2011 
establishing a Code of Good Government on March 17th 2011 (available at: 
http://www.lexnavarra.navarra.es/detalle.asp?r=12243). A year later, the Foral Act 11/2012, of June 21st 
on Transparency and Open Government was approved and subsequently modified in 2016 (available at: 
https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2012-9370). Finally, on May 17th 2018, the regional 
Parliament passed a new Foral Act 5/2018 on Transparency, Access to Public Information and Good 
Governance, that is far more comprehensive and largely abolishes the previous one (available at: 
https://www.boe.es/diario_boe/txt.php?id=BOE-A-2018-7642). 
28  Although most ACs have not approved these codes yet, exceptions can be found for example in 
Barcelona town council (https://ajuntament.barcelona.cat/transparencia/es/codigo-conducta), whereas the 
Ethical Code of the Public Service of Catalonia is also in the making.   
29  See, for example, the registry of Barcelona Provincial Council:  
(https://www.diba.cat/es/web/secretaria/registre-interessos) and the registry of the Catalan Generalitat 
(https://web.gencat.cat/es/tramits/tramits-temes/registre-grups-interes).   
30  To mention just a few: “Gobierno Abierto de Navarra” (http://gobiernoabierto.navarra.es/es), the 
Generalitat of Catalonia (http://governobert.gencat.cat/ca/transparencia/), and most large municipalities, 
such as Pamplona (http://www.pamplona.es/VerPagina.asp?IdPag=1936&Idioma=1), Tudela 
(https://tudela.transparencialocal.gob.es/), Barcelona (http://governobert.gencat.cat/ca/transparencia/), 
Girona (http://www.girona.cat/transparencia/cat/index.php#&panel1-1) or Lleida 
(http://www.paeria.cat/transparencia/es/).   
31  See the Oficina Antifrau de Catalunya  (https://www.antifrau.cat/es/), in operation from 2009 and the 
most recent Navarrese Good Practices and Anticorruption Office, created in April 2018 but not 




the inexistence of this type of bodies. Here, an anti-corruption office would have very 
little work and I wish that by not having one -simply because we do not need it here- 
Navarre is not ranked lower than other regions where anti-corruption offices exist 
because they are needed” (see also Interview 16).  
In the case of Catalonia, the regional law on transparency is one of the most 
demanding, but some experts have denounced that few effective resources have been 
invested in this matter, either because it was not high in the government’s list of 
priorities or due to budgetary constraints (Interview 5). As for the Oficina Antifrau de 
Catalunya, three main features have been praised: (1) its institutional dependency on 
the regional parliament (rather than the regional government); (2) its scope of action 
that encompasses all Catalan public sector, including the regional and local 
governments, public universities and public enterprises; and (3) its two-headed nature 
with functions of prevention as well as investigation, in some sort of “carrot and stick 
approach” (Interview 3).  
From the point of view of prevention, the Catalan Office is a service-provider 
institution that acts as a public consultancy and can make recommendations and 
allegations to reform procedures and regulations. It has also developed awareness 
campaigns about acceptable and non-acceptable behaviours addressed to public 
employees. It writes reports and studies; publishes a barometer on corruption every 
other year; responds to queries; and offers advice and training on its own initiative or 
under request. However, some interviewees regretted that the institution does not 
always have enough resources or case-oriented expertise to give advice on key 
undertakings like designing an ethical code within a framework of institutional 
integrity, what entails more than talking about ethics and values in a broad sense. As 
they put it, “at local level we often deal with ‘ethical dilemmas’ of little relevance if 
compared to major cases of political corruption, such as a janitor leaving the facility 
where he works half an hour earlier, or a member from the administrative staff taking 
office material home. Yet, when we sought the Oficina Antifrau’s help, we were simply 
given some photocopies from a book or a journal article” (Interviews 1 and 2).  
Regarding the second dimension of investigation and control, the Antifraud Office is 
not a judicial institution, neither it has any sanctioning powers; therefore, if an 
investigation reveals solid facts, the case must be brought before the competent 
administrative authority, the prosecutor's office or the court. Moreover, the starting 
point for most of its investigations are alleged misbehaviours or fraudulent actions 
reported by citizens or public employees through an anonymous box of complaints. If 
only because of the negligible results of the Office in this area, most experts have 
focused their criticism here.  
For example, it has been pointed out that the Office does not include a proper 
investigation unit, and it has only uncovered one or two prosecutable cases since it 
was created (Interview 5). Worries were also raised about the double-sword nature of 
anonymity, for it can lead to the unlawful use of complaints. In fact, “for the system to 
work properly, it is essential to protect the identity of the complainant, but also to 
provide enough guarantees for the defendant’s rights” (Interview 2). Moreover, there 
seems to be some blur of roles between institutions, that “sometimes makes it difficult 
to establish who does what” (Interview 1). Ultimately, since the Office’s main goal has 
always been “building an anti-corruption culture”, it has performed an important 
pedagogical task, but it has failed to achieve a good balance between the prevention 
and control functions (Interviews 10 and 12). 
The ethical codes have been valued as a positive instrument, but their usefulness and 
practical effects ultimately rest on their enactment and implementation. According to 
some interviewees, it is essential that they are built in a bottom-up fashion, because 
having officials and public employees involved in the elaboration of their own 
regulations facilitates that they become socialised into the appropriate values and 
practices. “Based on a top-down approach, however, many of these codes have been 
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made by a commission of experts; this was the case of the Catalan regional police 
forces, what left the mossos d’esquadra irritated and disengaged” (Interview 7). 
Regarding the issue of employment and hiring practices in the public sector, there is a 
broadly accepted view that public employees are fundamental for the development 
and promotion of governance. Therefore, it is essential a good model of human 
resources management, recruitment and selection that focuses on attracting the best 
candidates as well as retaining and enhancing talented workers already within the 
public administration (García, 2018). Moreover, the professionalization of public 
employees is considered an effective mechanism to fight corruption (Ibid).  
Taking this into consideration, most experts recognised the shortcoming of some 
widespread hiring practices of public employees that can be found at all territorial 
levels in Spain. Arguably, “although street-level bureaucrats tend to enter public 
administration through a clean selection process, the system was designed over a 
century ago and it, thus, seems no longer appropriate for the public administration of 
the 21st century” (Interview 2). At higher-ranked positions, where most discretionary 
appointments take place, there is a second trend that prioritises personal and political 
connections over professional capabilities and merits; or as it has been put in a more 
refined argument, “merits and capabilities do not necessarily guarantee reaching the 
top positions at public administration” (Interview 1). This is a typical problem for the 
bulk of state enterprises and foundations, where discretionary appointments are very 
significant, too. Even if the economic crisis has allowed a reduction in the number of 
discretionary positions, the common practice remains of hiring relatives, 
acquaintances, liked-minded people or those loyal to the political cause” (Ibid).  
As many interviewees have pointed out, Spanish ACs and municipalities -including 
Catalonia and Navarre- need meritocratic reforms to modify and modernize what can 
be considered an obsolete system of provision of public employment. Specifically, “it is 
necessary to develop a professional career that allows to keep public employees 
motivated, promotes an objective assessment of their merits and achievements and 
takes the latter into account for their promotion, as a means to retain talent and to 
contribute to the professionalization of public employees (Interview 6). 
 
14. Summary of Conclusions of the 2017 EQI Report 
This report has presented the findings of the third round of the European Quality of 
Government Index (EQI), which is based on a large citizen survey of perceptions and 
experiences with their local and regional public services and institutions. In addition, 
we presented the improvements vis-à-vis previous rounds of the index (2010 and 
2013) and demonstrated how the index was retrospectively changed to make valid 
comparisons of regional governance across and within countries and over time. 
Adjustments were made via several analyses of previous rounds of the data that 
pointed to areas of possible improvement (see Annoni and Charron 2018).  The data 
was presented over time to show trends associated with regional quality of 
government in Europe. Finally, we sought to corroborate and better understand some 
of the mechanisms for divergent changes in QoG within regions in the same country.  
Two in depth case study analyses were done following up the results of the third round 
of the QoG data – in Poland and Spain, where we observed positive trends over time 
in two regions (Pomorskie and Navarre) and more stagnant patterns in two other 
regions (Catalonia and Lubelske). 
As this report has shown through the European Quality of Government Index (EQI), – 
i.e. QoG defined as exercising power and implementing policies in an impartial, non-
corrupt, and efficient way – is still wide across both European countries and regions.  




time. On the one hand, the findings of this paper seem in line with the pessimistic 
literature noting that, instead of regional convergence, Europe is experiencing, if any, 
an increase in regional divergence in terms of economic growth, productivity, and 
employment (Farole, Rodríguez-Pose and Storper 2011:1090).  
On the other hand, there is also a more optimistic interpretation of the data. A 
principal finding of this study is the relatively high stability in quality of government, 
as measured by the index. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the old, mainly 
geographic dividing lines in quality of government, between Northern and Southern 
Europe, and very particularly, between Western and Eastern Europe, do seem to be, 
even if slowly, blurring. The divergences in the EQI are not as stark in 2017 as they 
were in 2010. For instance, we have high-performing Eastern regions that have 
surpassed many Western regions in quality of government, such as Jihovychod 
(CZ06), or Stredni Morava (CZ07) in the Czech Republic, and the country of Estonia 
(EE). In addition, the list of regions with the most significant improvements in quality 
of government in the period under study is dominated by Eastern regions, such as 
Bucharesti, (RO32) in Romania, Severen Tsentralen (BG32) in Bulgaria, Prague 
(CZ01) in the Czech Republic, or Pomorskie (PL63) in Poland. 
In contrast it is regions in Western Europe that are the ones demonstrating the most 
noticeable declines in quality of government, such as Guyane (FR93) in France, Valle 
d'Aosta (ITC2), Abruzzo (ITF1), or Piemonte (ITC1) in Italy, Canarias (ES70) in Spain, 
or Athens (EL3) in Greece. Yet regions in Western Europe are quite heterogeneous in 
terms of QoG. While most regions in Northern Europe have remained among the top 
performers, recent years have seen a fall of numerous Southern regions, particularly 
in Italy, Greece and Spain. At the same time, most regions in Portugal, as well as 
some Spanish ones in the northern part of the country, have shown improvements 
since 2010. In other words, geographic and historical legacies do matter, but they do 
not fully determine the quality of government in a region. In line with the literature, 
QoG is a generally stable characteristic of the region, but there are also notable 
changes. 
These results were largely confirmed by the expert interviewees in the four case study 
regions.  Mechanisms that were proposed to explain the variation in the regions within 
the same country were – differences in administrative practices, media culture, civil 
society, fiscal autonomy, and historical legacies.  These mechanisms can surely aid in 
crafting policy recomendations for improving the quality of government in more 
regions within Europe.   
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Table A1 : Factor analysis: Principle component of regional items 
Factor 
analysis/correlation Number of 
 
obs = 185 
Method: principal-component factors Retained factors = 3 
Rotation: (unrotated) Number of params = 51 
       -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Factor | Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative 
-------------+------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Factor1 | 9.95408 7.47533 0.553 0.553 
 Factor2 | 2.47874 0.66645 0.1377 0.6907 
 Factor3 | 1.8123 0.98815 0.1007 0.7914 
 Factor4 | 0.82415 0.08842 0.0458 0.8372 
 Factor5 | 0.73572 0.25103 0.0409 0.8781 
 Factor6 | 0.48469 0.07526 0.0269 0.905 
 Factor7 | 0.40943 0.10651 0.0227 0.9277 
 Factor8 | 0.30292 0.00838 0.0168 0.9446 
 Factor9 | 0.29455 0.06119 0.0164 0.9609 
 Factor10 | 0.23336 0.05689 0.013 0.9739 
 Factor11 | 0.17647 0.08582 0.0098 0.9837 
 Factor12 | 0.09065 0.01669 0.005 0.9887 
 Factor13 | 0.07396 0.02978 0.0041 0.9928 
 Factor14 | 0.04418 0.015 0.0025 0.9953 
 Factor15 | 0.02918 0.00836 0.0016 0.9969 
 Factor16 | 0.02082 0.00188 0.0012 0.9981 
 Factor17 | 0.01894 0.00309 0.0011 0.9991 
 Factor18 | 0.01585 . 0.0009 1 
 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 LR test: chi2(153)=4911.15, prob>chi2=0.0000 





Table A2 : Rotated factor loadings: Verimax 
 
     -------------- ----------- --------- ----------- -------------- 
Variable | Factor1 Factor2 Factor3 | Uniqueness 
-------------+ ----------- --------- ----------+ -------------- 
EdQual | 0.0528 0.7574 0.4037 0.2606 
HelQual | 0.3066 0.868 0.0477 0.1503 
LawQual | 0.1132 0.875 0.1042 0.2107 
EdImpart1 | 0.5677 -0.0431 0.6974 0.1894 
HelImpart1 | 0.6584 0.2272 0.438 0.3229 
LawImpart1 | 0.7937 0.2326 0.3713 0.1781 
EdImpart2 | 0.1679 0.4976 0.712 0.2174 
HelImpart2 | 0.3809 0.7072 0.2935 0.2686 
LawImpart2 | 0.429 0.5469 0.5404 0.2247 
EdCorr | 0.8807 0.1168 0.2202 0.1621 
HelCorr | 0.8747 0.3448 0.0602 0.1124 
LawCorr | 0.8935 0.1975 0.2641 0.0929 
NeedCorr | 0.8776 0.2907 0.245 0.0852 
GreedCorr | 0.8438 0.2109 0.1914 0.2069 
ElecCorr | 0.4602 0.1315 0.6798 0.3088 
TaxImpart | 0.3186 0.0523 0.8164 0.2292 
noAskB_any | 0.4693 0.7085 -0.1338 0.2599 
noPayB_any | 0.4774 0.5517 -0.4393 0.2747 
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stEdQual   
        stHelQual 0.641 
        stLawQual 0.711 0.818 
       stEdImpart1 0.310 0.177 0.139 
      stHelImpart1 0.346 0.430 0.270 0.729 
     stLawImpart1 0.391 0.466 0.427 0.755 0.776 
    stEdImpart2 0.628 0.469 0.399 0.566 0.497 0.415 
   stHelImpart2 0.592 0.794 0.573 0.352 0.744 0.528 0.655 
  stLawImpart2 0.545 0.575 0.601 0.559 0.618 0.730 0.750 0.675 
 stEdCorr 0.322 0.384 0.251 0.674 0.608 0.778 0.381 0.434 
 stHelCorr 0.392 0.604 0.393 0.507 0.737 0.776 0.334 0.684 
 stLawCorr 0.355 0.444 0.373 0.682 0.680 0.907 0.392 0.492 
 stNeedCorr 0.305 0.557 0.383 0.618 0.675 0.810 0.494 0.581 
 stGreedCorr 0.261 0.451 0.243 0.512 0.637 0.718 0.450 0.517 
 stElecCorr 0.362 0.250 0.238 0.606 0.502 0.551 0.626 0.392 
 stTaxImpart 0.376 0.213 0.153 0.686 0.510 0.523 0.611 0.367 
 stnoAskB_any 0.494 0.673 0.651 0.175 0.311 0.452 0.355 0.535 
 stnoPayB_any 0.243 0.520 0.375 -0.063 0.250 0.283 0.157 0.418 
 




















stHelImpart2   
        stLawImpart2   
        stEdCorr 0.467 
        stHelCorr 0.510 0.881 
       stLawCorr 0.666 0.917 0.874 
      stNeedCorr 0.702 0.840 0.842 0.891 
     stGreedCorr 0.611 0.727 0.775 0.792 0.906 
    stElecCorr 0.646 0.557 0.432 0.589 0.671 0.631 
   stTaxImpart 0.540 0.459 0.348 0.483 0.509 0.468 0.745 
  stnoAskB_any 0.515 0.509 0.585 0.533 0.597 0.456 0.309 0.136 







Table A4 : 2017 EQI and Pillar Estimates with Past Data Retroactively 
Changed 
nuts name eqi2017 quality_17 impartiality_17 corruption_17 eqi2013 eqi2010 
AT Austria 0.805 0.674 1.000 0.654 0.820 1.063 
AT11 Burgenland 0.787 0.385 1.315 0.575 0.945 1.310 
AT12 Niederöstrerreich 0.724 0.448 1.064 0.582 0.998 1.062 
AT13 Wien 0.860 0.709 1.050 0.727 0.391 1.088 
AT21 Kärnten 0.653 0.355 0.993 0.542 0.778 1.213 
AT22 Steiermark 0.760 0.611 0.952 0.637 1.010 0.936 
AT31 Oberösterreich 0.705 0.713 0.701 0.625 0.886 0.984 
AT32 Salzburg 0.894 0.833 1.031 0.723 0.778 0.964 
AT33 Tirol 1.032 1.271 1.066 0.647 1.247 1.192 
AT34 Voralberg 1.084 0.844 1.373 0.917 0.452 1.135 
BE Belgium 0.616 0.635 0.383 0.762 0.629 0.345 
BE1 Brussels -0.105 -0.343 -0.477 0.516 0.043 -0.416 
BE2 Vlaams Gewest 0.969 1.125 0.875 0.802 1.088 0.733 
BE3 Wallonie 0.221 0.082 -0.215 0.772 0.001 -0.098 
BG Bulgaria -1.731 -1.635 -1.854 -1.519 -1.860 -1.902 
BG31 Severozapaden -2.264 -2.113 -2.781 -1.654 -2.270 -2.655 
BG32 Severen Tsentralen -0.997 -1.581 -0.955 -0.347 -1.677 -2.200 
BG33 Severoiztochen -1.364 -1.317 -1.524 -1.104 -0.467 -1.195 
BG34 Yugoiztochen -2.189 -1.814 -1.957 -2.561 -1.860 -2.275 
BG41 Yugozapaden -1.882 -1.778 -1.676 -1.992 -2.817 -2.016 
BG42 Yuzhen Tsentralen -1.541 -1.272 -2.264 -0.921 -1.245 -1.344 
CY Cyprus -0.106 -0.134 -0.215 0.044 0.011 0.198 
CZ Czech Rep. -0.296 -0.142 -0.051 -0.663 -0.498 -0.582 
CZ01 Praha -0.163 0.153 0.104 -0.728 -0.534 -1.016 
CZ02 Stredni Cechy -0.647 -0.075 -0.940 -0.856 -0.486 -0.410 
CZ03 Jihozapad -0.291 -0.250 0.115 -0.707 -0.344 -0.212 
CZ04 Severozapad -0.992 -0.740 -0.869 -1.262 -0.989 -1.007 
CZ05 Severovychod -0.171 -0.247 0.280 -0.527 -0.388 -0.302 
CZ06 Jihovychod 0.015 0.066 0.382 -0.406 -0.277 -0.598 
CZ07 Stedni Morava -0.023 -0.081 0.315 -0.299 -0.452 -0.675 
CZ08 Moravskoslezsko -0.276 -0.085 -0.031 -0.681 -0.662 -0.527 
DE Germany 1.013 0.980 0.904 1.047 0.770 0.773 
DE1 Baden Wuttemberg 1.076 1.238 0.833 1.041 0.889 0.877 
DE2 Bavaria 1.343 1.924 0.809 1.152 0.946 0.648 
DE3 Berlin 0.610 0.008 0.742 1.015 0.410 0.869 
DE4 Brandenburg 0.738 0.372 0.874 0.890 0.511 0.864 
DE5 Bremen 1.094 0.632 1.407 1.127 0.753 0.847 
DE6 Hamburg 1.247 1.316 1.096 1.193 0.688 0.853 





0.975 1.333 1.067 0.750 0.840 





0.483 0.704 1.003 0.636 0.648 
Measuring the quality of Government at the subnational level and comparing results with previous studies 
103 
 
DEB Rhineland-Palatinate 1.128 1.205 1.025 1.035 0.931 0.732 
DEC Saarland 1.036 0.984 0.847 1.166 0.927 0.932 
DED Saxony 0.819 0.615 0.787 0.967 0.710 0.969 
DEE Saxony-Anhalt 0.588 0.288 0.636 0.776 0.322 0.771 
DEF Schleswig-Holstein 1.107 0.875 1.249 1.078 0.995 1.129 
DEG Thuringia 0.949 0.871 0.885 0.991 0.425 1.181 
DK Denmark 1.400 1.231 1.280 1.539 1.545 1.549 
DK01 Hovedstaden 1.341 1.097 1.197 1.584 1.518 1.431 
DK02 Sjaelland 1.230 0.861 1.145 1.553 1.347 1.557 
DK03 Syddanmark 1.362 1.239 1.209 1.491 1.576 1.542 
DK04 Midtylland 1.648 1.674 1.528 1.566 1.638 1.762 
DK05 Nordjylland 1.350 1.164 1.322 1.420 1.636 1.441 
EE Estonia 0.231 0.054 0.248 0.369 -0.052 -0.103 
ES Spain -0.327 -0.013 -0.381 -0.553 -0.047 -0.054 





0.529 0.387 -0.286 0.423 0.371 
ES13 Cantabria 0.423 0.631 0.726 -0.133 0.407 0.048 
ES21 Pais Vasco 0.652 0.948 0.672 0.268 0.283 0.511 
ES22 Navarra 0.502 0.732 0.486 0.235 0.263 0.073 
ES23 La Rioja 0.244 0.885 0.104 -0.284 0.368 0.137 





0.494 -0.452 -0.679 0.262 -0.153 
ES41 Castilla y León -0.322 0.309 -0.689 -0.552 0.243 -0.130 
ES42 Castilla-La Mancha -0.301 -0.127 -0.223 -0.519 -0.221 0.107 
ES43 Extremadura 0.023 0.353 -0.023 -0.264 0.144 0.289 





-0.046 -0.564 -0.678 -0.275 0.053 
ES53 Illes Balears -0.545 -0.429 -0.411 -0.738 -0.026 0.019 
ES61 Andalucia -0.739 -0.606 -0.805 -0.728 -0.119 -0.251 
ES62 Región de Murcia -0.136 0.302 -0.143 -0.551 0.326 0.164 
ES63 Ceuta (ES)  
     
ES64 Melilla (ES)  
     
ES70 Canarias (ES) -0.711 -0.814 -0.471 -0.773 -0.574 0.163 
FI Finland 1.428 1.195 1.328 1.608 1.497 1.398 
FI13 Itä-Suomi  
   
1.419 1.398 
FI18 Etelä-Suomi 
    
1.525 1.398 
FI19 Länsi-Suomi 1.336 1.106 1.218 1.540 1.496 1.398 
FI1A Pohjois-Suomi  
   
1.521 1.398 
FI20 Åland 2.323 2.033 2.176 2.512 2.639 1.398 
FI1B Helsinki-Uusimaa 1.495 1.315 1.407 1.602 
 
1.398 







1.114 1.380 1.676 
 
1.398 
FR France 0.409 0.424 0.361 0.397 0.421 0.690 





0.464 0.175 0.338 0.258 0.211 




FR23 Haute-Normandie 0.454 0.524 0.280 0.510 0.319 0.153 
FR24 Centre 0.420 0.328 0.443 0.443 0.774 0.595 
FR25 Basse-Normandie 0.390 0.304 0.495 0.328 0.683 0.496 
FR26 Bourgogne 0.283 0.162 0.228 0.430 0.289 0.474 
FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais 0.293 0.637 0.074 0.136 0.145 0.531 
FR41 Lorraine 0.238 0.479 -0.109 0.316 0.359 0.262 
FR42 Alsace 0.380 0.648 0.128 0.321 0.555 0.468 
FR43 Franche-Comte 0.185 0.164 0.209 0.162 0.511 0.483 
FR51 Pays de la Loire 0.719 0.694 0.712 0.674 0.577 0.362 
FR52 Bretagne 0.769 0.795 0.744 0.683 0.961 0.973 
FR53 Poitou-Charentes 0.321 0.446 0.169 0.313 0.723 0.733 
FR61 Aquitaine 0.695 0.850 0.513 0.648 0.767 0.779 
FR62 Midi-Pyrenees 0.434 0.381 0.471 0.403 0.722 0.394 
FR63 Limousin 0.619 0.587 0.642 0.561 0.546 0.692 
FR71 Rhone-Alpes 0.578 0.635 0.489 0.548 0.624 0.752 










0.259 0.377 -0.020 0.058 0.232 
FR83 Corse 0.072 -0.091 0.318 -0.020 0.180 0.152 
FR91 Guadeloupe -1.030 -1.294 -1.014 -0.672 -0.402 -0.484 
FR92 Martinique -0.726 -0.835 -0.886 -0.379 -0.101 -0.358 
FR93 Guyane -1.557 -2.700 -1.191 -0.613 -0.617 -0.449 
FR94 Reunion -0.413 -0.221 -0.322 -0.651 -0.100 -0.106 
EL Greece -1.387 -1.397 -1.324 -1.293 -0.326 -0.300 
EL5 Voreia Ellada -1.707 -1.756 -1.737 -1.445 -1.142 -1.333 
EL6 Kentriki Ellada -1.236 -1.181 -1.069 -1.325 -1.213 -1.040 
EL3 Attica -1.212 -1.302 -1.153 -1.053 -1.297 -0.343 
EL4 Nisia Aigaiou-Kriti -1.462 -1.262 -1.378 -1.590 -0.906 -0.909 
HR Croatia -1.211 -1.224 -1.381 -0.899 -1.003 -0.997 





-1.224 -1.431 -0.929 -1.294 -1.494 





-1.469 -1.312 -1.427 -0.972 -1.046 
HU21 Közép-Dunántúl -0.969 -1.334 -0.660 -0.807 -0.607 -0.417 
HU22 Nyugat-Dunántúl -1.016 -1.237 -1.010 -0.693 -0.607 -0.417 
HU23 Dél-Dunántúl -0.980 -0.961 -0.956 -0.917 -0.607 -0.417 
HU31 Észak-Magyarország -1.089 -1.481 -0.925 -0.745 -0.802 -0.524 
HU32 Észak-Alföld -1.266 -1.019 -1.565 -1.080 -0.802 -0.524 
HU33 Dél-Alföld -0.748 -0.769 -0.717 -0.677 -0.802 -0.524 
IE Ireland 0.839 0.693 0.914 0.821 0.738 0.797 
IE01 
Border, Midland and 
Western 
0.901 





0.639 0.918 0.806 0.700 0.797 
IT Italy -1.130 -0.759 -1.315 -1.195 -1.162 -1.079 
ITC1 Piemonte -1.190 -0.769 -1.509 -1.163 -0.878 -0.324 
ITC2 Valle d'Aosta -0.677 -1.417 -0.098 -0.444 0.354 0.407 
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ITC3 Ligura -1.251 -0.589 -1.433 -1.595 -1.057 -0.665 
ITC4 Lombardia -0.481 0.512 -1.098 -0.806 -0.773 -0.781 
ITH1 Bolzano -0.364 -0.496 -0.151 -0.405 0.686 0.526 
ITH2 Trento -0.364 -0.496 -0.151 -0.405 0.720 0.268 
ITH3 Veneto -0.459 0.399 -0.728 -1.000 -0.433 -0.621 
ITH4 Friuli-Venezia Giulia -0.488 -0.353 -0.540 -0.519 0.092 -0.037 
ITH5 Emilia-Romagna -0.457 -0.028 -0.766 -0.528 -0.464 -0.518 
ITI1 Toscana -0.849 -0.942 -1.049 -0.466 -0.760 -0.704 
ITI2 Umbria -1.510 -1.418 -1.481 -1.468 -0.725 -0.383 
ITI3 Marche -1.383 -1.398 -0.890 -1.714 -0.760 -0.624 
ITI4 Lazio -1.530 -1.353 -1.691 -1.380 -1.679 -1.340 
ITF1 Abruzzo -1.978 -2.404 -0.779 -2.539 -1.291 -1.023 
ITF2 Molise -1.183 -0.787 -0.868 -1.768 -1.822 -1.308 
ITF3 Campania -1.877 -1.642 -2.004 -1.783 -2.370 -2.284 
ITF4 Puglia -1.545 -1.096 -1.587 -1.786 -1.771 -1.756 
ITF5 Basilicata -1.668 -1.766 -0.889 -2.168 -1.602 -1.333 
ITF6 Calabria -2.183 -2.574 -2.293 -1.449 -1.845 -2.167 
ITG1 Sicilia -1.544 -1.381 -1.875 -1.212 -1.749 -1.843 
ITG2 Sardegna -1.234 -1.186 -0.813 -1.572 -1.488 -0.999 
LT Lithuania -0.263 -0.043 -0.253 -0.467 -0.809 -0.992 
LU Luxembourgh 1.200 1.051 1.019 1.401 1.223 1.031 
LV Latvia -0.513 -0.298 -0.533 -0.654 -0.885 -0.937 
MT Malta -0.075 -0.179 -0.003 -0.034 0.028 0.297 
NL Netherlands 1.205 1.224 1.125 1.136 1.236 1.096 
NL11 Groningen 1.351 1.357 1.426 1.127 1.296 1.430 
NL12 Friesland (NL) 1.351 1.357 1.426 1.127 1.333 1.430 
NL13 Drenthe 1.351 1.357 1.426 1.127 1.120 1.430 
NL21 Overijssel 1.331 1.273 1.362 1.214 1.530 1.030 
NL22 Gelderland 1.331 1.273 1.362 1.214 1.226 1.030 
NL23 Flevoland 1.331 1.273 1.362 1.214 1.191 1.030 
NL31 Utrecht 1.105 1.081 0.981 1.132 1.333 1.122 
NL32 Noord-Holland 1.105 1.081 0.981 1.132 1.114 1.122 
NL33 Zuid-Holland 1.105 1.081 0.981 1.132 1.274 1.122 
NL34 Zeeland 1.105 1.081 0.981 1.132 1.173 1.122 
NL41 Noord-Brabant 1.228 1.420 1.060 1.071 1.154 0.945 
NL42 Limburg (NL) 1.228 1.420 1.060 1.071 1.210 0.945 
PL Poland -0.461 -0.373 -0.523 -0.437 -0.679 -0.964 
PL11 Lodzkie -0.660 -0.474 -0.757 -0.676 -0.782 -0.878 
PL12 Mazowieckie -0.522 -0.477 -0.648 -0.384 -0.826 -1.014 
PL21 Malopolskie -0.401 -0.267 -0.472 -0.422 -0.567 -0.913 
PL22 Slaskie -0.480 -0.390 -0.594 -0.405 -0.933 -1.123 
PL31 Lubelskie -0.632 -0.300 -0.891 -0.635 -0.687 -0.931 
PL32 Podkarpackie -0.626 -0.332 -0.725 -0.755 -0.801 -0.886 
PL33 Swietokrzyskie -0.511 -0.407 -0.680 -0.391 -0.731 -0.842 
PL34 Podlaskie -0.456 -0.075 -0.727 -0.517 -0.399 -0.979 
PL41 Wielkopolskie -0.464 -0.364 -0.754 -0.222 -0.666 -1.019 




PL43 Lubuskie -0.411 -0.711 -0.267 -0.210 -0.433 -0.955 
PL51 Dolnoslaskie -0.482 -0.509 -0.380 -0.507 -0.936 -1.120 










-0.423 -0.199 -0.369 -0.500 -0.723 
PL63 Pomorskie -0.133 -0.034 0.096 -0.447 -0.425 -0.890 
PT Portugal 0.032 0.148 -0.022 -0.034 -0.125 -0.124 
PT11 Norte -0.063 0.368 -0.359 -0.193 -0.295 -0.411 
PT15 Algarve -0.292 -0.891 -0.040 0.085 0.148 0.073 
PT16 Centro 0.070 -0.014 0.307 -0.092 -0.131 -0.153 
PT17 Lisboa 0.108 0.123 0.091 0.099 -0.231 0.005 
PT18 Alentejo 0.247 0.056 0.292 0.365 0.777 0.535 
PT20 Açores 0.009 0.200 -0.112 -0.062 0.406 0.337 
PT30 Madeira 0.169 0.745 -0.192 -0.063 -0.066 0.124 
RO Romania -1.555 -1.856 -1.449 -1.194 -1.924 -1.874 
RO11 Nord-Vest -1.849 -1.811 -2.015 -1.523 -1.907 -1.197 
RO12 Centru -1.434 -1.591 -1.430 -1.127 -1.369 -1.596 
RO21 Nord-Est -1.580 -1.803 -1.237 -1.531 -1.940 -1.986 
RO22 Sud-Est -1.973 -1.896 -2.141 -1.669 -2.186 -2.001 
RO31 Sud-Muntenia -1.104 -1.538 -1.079 -0.577 -1.758 -1.768 
RO32 Bucuresti-Ilfov -1.578 -2.422 -1.237 -0.908 -2.465 -2.838 
RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia -1.615 -2.046 -1.524 -1.100 -1.932 -1.504 
RO42 Vest -1.341 -1.910 -0.909 -1.059 -1.869 -2.191 
SE Sweden 1.403 1.220 1.280 1.558 1.432 1.302 
SE1 Östra Sverige 1.417 1.260 1.253 1.584 1.468 1.289 
SE2 Södra Sverige 1.440 1.238 1.366 1.560 1.443 1.361 
SE3 Norra Sverige 1.282 1.083 1.128 1.497 1.323 1.186 
SI Slovenia -0.293 -0.297 -0.292 -0.260 -0.200 -0.196 
SK Slovakia -0.811 -0.413 -0.977 -0.958 -0.824 -0.813 
SK01 Bratislavský kraj -0.954 -0.605 -1.121 -1.034 -0.920 -0.632 
SK02 Západné Slovensko -1.013 -0.531 -1.106 -1.293 -0.721 -0.889 
SK03 Stredné Slovensko -0.626 -0.202 -0.765 -0.845 -0.728 -0.802 
SK04 Východné Slovensko -0.681 -0.379 -0.949 -0.644 -0.981 -0.808 
UK United Kingdom 0.986 0.814 0.933 1.106 0.720 0.748 
UKC Northeast England 1.129 1.167 1.068 1.033 0.625 0.751 
UKD Northwest England 0.753 0.829 0.545 0.803 0.766 0.858 










0.920 1.241 1.116 0.577 0.647 
UKH East of England 1.074 0.836 0.994 1.277 0.813 0.617 
UKI London 1.004 0.972 0.823 1.109 0.903 0.368 
UKJ South East England 1.034 0.895 0.930 1.166 0.963 0.903 
UKK South West England 1.124 0.738 1.210 1.303 0.451 0.908 
UKL Wales 1.046 0.541 1.320 1.165 0.331 0.656 
UKM Scotland 0.977 0.772 1.073 0.981 0.543 1.071 
UKN N. Ireland 0.559 -0.331 0.787 1.162 0.651 0.768 




Note: country estimates for member states included in the EQI survey (e.g. those with regional 
data) are calculated via population weighted averages after computing the final index so as to 




Table A5 : The structure of the case-study questionnaire (English version) 
Profession 




1. Do you agree with the assessment of your region in the above mentioned ranking 
against the background of your country and the EU? Do you think that the province 
XXXXX distinguishes the quality of public services, the level of corruption or equality in 
the treatment of citizens, if not, why? // 
2. How do you perceive public institutions operating in your region (regardless of 
whether they are dependent on local, regional or national authorities) in terms of: [a) 
Level of their impartiality] 
2. How do you perceive public institutions operating in your region (regardless of 
whether they depend on local, regional or national authorities) in terms of: [b) The 
level of their effectiveness in providing public services] 
2. How do you perceive public institutions operating in your region (regardless of 
whether they are dependent on local, regional or national authorities) in terms of: [c) 
Level of their corruption] 
2a. In your opinion, how should public institutions in your region be evaluated in 
comparison to other regions in Poland/Spain? Are you better or worse? 
3. In your opinion, what are the main reasons for your region's position compared to 
other regions of Poland/Spain? Is this a matter of economic resources? Is this related 
to which political parties rule in the region? Is this related to the role played by civil 
society (e.g. business associations, trade unions, non-governmental organizations)? 
4. What is the level of your trust in each of these institutions? [A) Police] 
4. What is the level of your trust in each of these institutions? [B) Media] 
4. What is the level of your trust in each of these institutions? [c) Marshal's Office] 
4. What is the level of your trust in each of these institutions? [d) Regional Office] 
4. What is the level of your trust in each of these institutions? [e) Political parties] 
4. What is the level of your trust in each of these institutions? [F) Business] 
4. What is the level of your trust in each of these institutions? [G) Hospitals] 
4. What is the level of your trust for each of these institutions? [H) Army] 
5. What is the level of your confidence in the news that can be found on: [Public 
Television] 
5. What is the level of your confidence in the news that can be found on: [Regional 
Public Television] 
5. What is the level of your confidence in the news that can be found on: [Private 
Television] 
5. What is the level of your confidence in the news that can be found on: [Regional 
Television] 
5. What is the level of your trust in the news that can be found on: [Public radio 
(nationwide stations)] 
5. What is the level of your trust in the news that can be found on: [Private radio 




5. What is the level of your trust in the news that can be found on: [Local (public) 
radio] 
5. What is the level of your trust in the news that can be found on: [Local radio (non-
public)] 
5. What is the level of your confidence in the news that can be found in: [nationwide 
newspapers] 
5. What is the level of your confidence in the news that can be found in: [Local 
newspapers] 
5. What is the level of your confidence in the news that can be found in: [Internet 
(news portals)] 
6. In the latest edition of World Press Freedom 2018 Poland/Spain ranked in the Xth 
position (among 180 countries) in terms of press freedom. Do you think that there are 
obstacles to freedom of the press in your region? Which of them are the most 
important in your opinion? Is there any specific factor or entity that negatively affects 
the freedom of the press today? 
7. Do you think that news presented in local media really reflect what is happening in 
the region?   
7a. Are any events hidden or presented in an exaggerated way? 
8. How independent are the media in your region? 
9. Is the media entirely free to present what is happening on the following issues: [a) 
Corruption] 
9. Are the media entirely free to present what is happening on the following issues: 
[b) Security] 
9. Are the media entirely free to present what is happening on the following issues: 
[c) Economy] 
9. Are the media entirely free to present what is happening on the following issues: 
[d) Politics] 
9. Are the media entirely free to present what is happening on the following issues: 
[e) Public health] 
10a. Do you think that the media protect or attack the authorities (regional office)? 
10b. Do you think that the media protect or attack the authorities (Marshal's office)? 
11. Which media do you consider more credible: state or private ones? Why? 
12. Do you think that today there is more press freedom than twenty years ago? 
Why? 
13. Focusing primarily on people at the head of public sector organizations (hospital 
directors, school heads, directors of other public entities), what is the most important, 
in your opinion, to get these positions: personal / political connections? Or maybe 
skills and experience? 
13a. Do you think this way of recruitment for the highest positions in the 
administration is similar to that in other regions of Poland/Spain? 
14. Looking at the rest of the employees of public institutions (e.g. policemen, school 
teachers, doctors, lower-level officials), what is the most important to get the 
employment: personal / political connections? Or maybe experience and skills? 
14a. Do you think this way of recruiting for lower positions in administration is similar 




15. In general, what do you think is the most important for a successful career in the 
public sector in the region: personal / political connections or maybe skills and 
experience of candidates? 
Do you think that this pattern is similar to that existing in other regions of 
Poland/Spain? 
16. Imagine that an employee of a public institution discovers that something is wrong 
in their organization (eg that the superior or politician has been involved in suspicious 
business or plans to do so), what do you think they would do? Would they report it to 
the media, the relevant authority or the judiciary? 
17. Will this employee be afraid of repercussions if he/she decides to disclose the 
case? 
18. Do you think that there is adequate protection against unjustified sanctions 
against public employees who, in the public interest, report instances of corruption or 
other malfunctioning to relevant institutions or media? 
19. What strategy is applied in your region in order to enforce compliance with the 
rules and good conduct of employees of public institutions? 
20. Can you give examples of measures implemented to enforce good behaviour of 
public authorities? For example, do you know if there is an ethical code for officials 
and / or elected regional authorities? 
21. Do you think public opinion (citizens) express their dissatisfaction when they see 
cases of corruption? Can this public opinion act as a restraint for the authorities? Is 
public pressure present and effective in enforcing good behaviour of public officials? Is 
the public opinion "tolerant" or "indifferent" to corruption scandals? 
22. Who discovers corruption scandals in your region? Are these media? Judicial 
authorities? 
23. Is there any public body involved in prosecuting corruption? Has anything changed 
in the last 10-15 years (for better / worse)? Why? 
24. Have you observed a significant change in the quality of public services since 
joining the EU? If so, please provide the scale of changes: 
25. Do you expect a change in government quality in the next five years (for better or 
for worse)? 
26. Please specify the level of improvement of services provided by the following 
public institutions after the EU accession/the financial crisis: [a. school] 
26. Please specify the level of improvement of services provided by the following 
public institutions after the EU accession/the financial crisis: [b. universities] 
26. Please specify the level of improvement of services provided by the following 
public institutions after the EU accession/the financial crisis: [c. hospitals] 
26. Please specify the level of improvement of services provided by the following 
public institutions after the EU accession/the financial crisis: [d. courts] 
26. Please specify the level of improvement of services provided by the following 
public institutions after the EU accession/the financial crisis: [e. Police] 
27. What are the positive and negative aspects of the functioning of public 
administration in the last 10 years in your region? 
28. With regard to various public services (health care services, education, law 
enforcement, business license, etc.). To what extent, in your opinion: [... people with 
appropriate political connections seem to have the possibility of preferential access to 
services (e.g. schools for children, preferences in access to healthcare, running a 
business)?] 
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28. With regard to various public services (health care services, education, law 
enforcement, business license, etc.). To what extent, in your opinion: [... people with 
personal or family connections seem to have preferential access to services (e.g. 
schools for children, preferences in access to healthcare, running a business)?] 
28. With regard to various public services (health care services, education, law 
enforcement, business license, etc.). To what extent, in your opinion: [... wealthy 
people seem to have preferential access to services (e.g. schools for children, 
preferences in access to healthcare, running a business)?] 
28. With regard to various public services (health care services, education, law 
enforcement, business license, etc.). To what extent, in your opinion: [... people who 
have a certain ethnic / linguistic origin seem to have preferential access to services 
(e.g. schools for children, preferences in access to health care, running a business)?] 
29. Do you recall any matter (presented in the media or elsewhere) where the public 
institution in your region (whether of national, regional or local administration level) 
has been accused of favoring or violating impartiality? What happened? In your 








Annex: Interviewees (Spain) 
 
Interview 1: High civil servant at local level. Catalonia. 
Interview 2:   Local government employee. Catalonia. 
Interview 3:   Member of a regional anti-corruption body.  
Interview 4: High civil servant at local level. Catalonia. 
Interview 5:  Businessman. Navarra.  
Interview 6:  High civil servant at local and regional level. Catalonia.  
Interview 7:  High civil servant at regional level; department responsible for 
transparency and open government. Catalonia.  
Interview 8: Member of the regional government. Catalonia.  
Interview 9:  Journalist. Navarra.  
Interview 10:  Political scientist.  
Interview 11: Former member of the regional government. Navarra.  
Interview 12:  Political scientist.  
Interview 13:  Former member of the regional government. Catalonia.  
Interview 14: Civil servant at local level. Catalonia. 
Interview 15: High civil servant at local level. Catalonia. 
Interview 16: Former member of the regional government. Navarra. 
Interview 17:  Representative of a civil society organization. Navarra.   
Interview 18:  Legal scholar. 








HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS 
Free publications: 
• one copy: 
via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu); 
• more than one copy or posters/maps: 
from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);  
from the delegations in non-EU countries 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);  
by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) 
or calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*). 
 
(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may 
charge you). 
Priced publications: 
• via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu). 
Priced subscriptions: 
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